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Abstract
Large electricity customers (e.g., large data centers) can exhibit huge and variable electricity
demands, which poses significant challenges for the electricity suppliers to plan for sufficient capac-
ity. Thus, it is desirable to design incentive and coordination mechanisms between the customers
and the supplier to lower the capacity cost. This paper proposes a novel scheme based on flexible
contracts. Unlike existing demand-side management schemes in the literature, a flexible contract
leads to information revelation. That is, a customer committing to a flexible contract reveals
valuable information about its future demand to the supplier. Such information revelation allows
the customers and the supplier to share the risk of future demand uncertainty. On the other hand,
the customer will still retain its autonomy in operation. We address two key challenges for the
design of optimal flexible contracts: i) the contract design is a non-convex optimization problem
and is intractable for a large number of customer types, and ii) the design should be robust to
unexpected or adverse responses of the customers, i.e., a customer facing more than one contract
yielding the same benefit may choose the contract less favorable to the supplier. We address these
challenges by proposing sub-optimal contracts of low computational complexity that can achieve
a provable fraction of the performance gain under the global optimum.
1 Introduction
Large electricity customers can exhibit huge and uncertain electricity demand, which poses new chal-
lenges to the electricity supplier. Some commercial and industrial entities consume a huge amount of
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electricity. For example, in 2014, Google data centers consumed 4.4 billion KWh of electricity, which
is enough to power 366,903 US households [1]. Moreover, these large customers’ demand can change
dramatically over time due to the internal scheduling of their own business operations and workload.
For example, the power usage of an IBM data center in the same hour can change by 50% over differ-
ent days of a week [2]. Their local generation (through fossil-fuel and renewable sources) further adds
variability to the net-demand seen by the supplier. The electricity supplier has to provision enough
capacity so that it has adequate generating resources to meet the demand at all times. However,
capacity is costly [3]. For example, in areas where ISOs (Independent System Operator) run capacity
markets (e.g., NYISO, PJM) [4], the suppliers have to shoulder significant capacity costs based on
their peak demand. When a large fraction of the customer’s load is highly variable and uncertain, the
supplier has to incur a much higher cost to over-provision capacity in order to ensure that demand
and supply can be balanced at all time.
Generally, the customers have better knowledge of their workload schedule and electricity demands
than the supplier. Thus, one promising way for the supplier to reduce the capacity cost is to overcome
this information asymmetry. That is, the supplier can better predict the future capacity needs if it can
learn useful information about the future demand of the customers. However, there is no systematic
study in the literature to investigate how to motivate the customers to reveal their future demand
information to the supplier. Without proper incentives, customers are unwilling to reveal their private
information as they may lose the freedom to adjust their demands in the future. Thus, proper design
of incentive mechanisms is crucial. In this work, we propose a new approach using flexible contracts. A
flexible contract sets a lower price of electricity and a commitment range for future demand ahead of
time. We use the term “flexible contract” to contrast with “strict contract”: the latter sets a discounted
price for a specific amount of future demand. Indeed, “flexible contract” is more flexible than “strict
contract”. For a customer that commits to a flexible contract, it will enjoy the price discount as long
as its future net-demand is within the committed demand range. At the same time, the supplier can
better estimate the future demand from the information revealed by the flexible contract and better
prepare the capacity. In this way, the contract leads to a win-win situation to both the supplier and
the customers.
Although there exist many demand-side management schemes in the literature, the above informa-
tion revelation capability is unique to flexible contracts and its has the distinctive advantage to enable
the customers and the supplier to share the risk of future demand uncertainty, while still allows the
customers to retain their autonomy. In contrast, existing schemes often expose the risks of uncertainty
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mainly towards either the supplier or the customers, or forcibly intervene in the customers’ internal
operations. For example, at one extreme, the supplier may pass the risks to the customers by charging
them with highly-dynamic prices (e.g., real-time pricing or critical peak pricing [6, 8]) or very high
price on peak demand (e.g., the peak-based pricing [9]). While these pricing schemes could reshape de-
mand, it causes significant financial uncertainty to the customers’ normal operations, especially when
their own demand is uncertain. In comparison, our proposed flexible contracts allow the customers to
accept an controlled amount of future risk in exchange for a better price. As we will show in Section
6, our flexible contract can significantly lower capacity cost compared to the peak-based pricing. At
the other extreme, static pricing schemes (e.g., the time-of-use pricing) do not provide a feedback loop
for the supplier to learn the private operation decisions of the customers, and thus expose significant
risks to the supplier. In comparison, our flexible contracts enable the supplier to learn and exploit the
private workload information revealed by the customers. Another line of work argues for direct-load
control (i.e., the supplier directly controls the energy consumption of the customers [10]) or enforcing
quotas on the energy consumption of the customers [7]. These schemes are more intrusive to the
customers’ privacy and limit operation flexibility. In contrast, our flexible contracts still provide the
customers with the freedom to reveal different levels of their private information as well as choose
different demand variation ranges. Our idea of flexible contracts is also related to swing contracts [11].
However, [11] studies the transmission level, and the focus is on how an ISO can clear the market with
offers specified by swing contracts. In contrast, we study the distribution level, and our focus is on
how to motivate customers to truthfully pick the specified contract that reveals their true capacity
need.
We summarize the key novelty and main contributions as follows. First, we propose the flexible
contract as a novel approach to learn and exploit customers’ private demand information by providing
them with electricity price discounts as incentives. Our model is comprehensive because it captures
customers’ demand diversity both in the mean and variation, and further incorporates their demand
elasticity.
Second, we formulate the flexible contract design problem as a bi-level optimization problem to
maximize the supplier’s profit by taking into account the customers’ preferred contract choices. The
optimization problem, however, is non-convex and intractable for a large number of customer types.
To address this challenge, we propose an approximate contract design to achieve at least 12 of the
maximum performance gain achieved by the optimal contract.
Third, we take into account the situation where a customer may face more than one contract
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yielding the same benefit. For such situation, existing literature often assumes that the customer will
always choose, from those with equal benefit, the contract most favorable to the supplier. Such an
optimistic assumption may be unrealistic. In contrast, we further study the optimal contract design
in the pessimistic setting where the customer will choose the contract least favorable to the supplier.
Even in this setting, we design a robust contract to still achieve at least 13 of the maximum possible
profit gain.
Finally, we evaluate the empirical performances of our proposed flexible contracts and compare
it to a typical pricing scheme, i.e., the peak-based pricing. The flexible contracts show significant
performance gains thanks to information revelation. Specifically, our contract scheme not only increases
the supplier’s profit, but also reduces each customer’s cost, thus achieves a win-win situation.
We note that our proposed flexible contract scheme is a way to design pricing mechanism so that
customers have an incentive to reveal their expected consumption range. There may be other ways
to design such pricing mechanisms for information revelation. However, for any such pricing mecha-
nisms (including our proposed flexible contract), there is the risk that the consumers may untruthly
report their information. Thus, we will face the same technical challenge of how to design the pricing
mechanisms under such a risk. Our key message is that, while the optimal contract can be difficult
to design, approximate solutions can be found with low complexity and can yield good results. Our
study thus reveals important and useful insights for other pricing mechanisms in the future, which will
face similar difficulty.
2 System Model and Problem Formulation
We next present the models of customers and the supplier as well as the problem formulation for the
flexible contract.
2.1 Customers’ Demands and Costs
We first present the model for the customers with the crucial feature of information uncertainty. There
are N customers connecting to the supplier. We are interested in large customers (e.g., Google data
center, IBM data center), the number of which is small in practice [16]. These customers purchase
electricity from the supplier to meet their net-demands. For a future time period (e.g., peak hours) of
interest, we assume that each customer’s mean usage can take values m1,m2, . . . ,mn with probability
h(m1), . . . , h(mn), respectively, where
∑n
i=1 h(mi) = 1. We refer to a customer as type-mi if its mean
usage is mi, i = 1, . . . , n. Without loss of generality, we assume that m1 < m2 < . . . < mn. Although
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the assumption that each customer’s mean usage follows a discrete distribution is taken for analysis
tractability, we believe that it is not restrictive, because it can be used to approximate real systems
where the mean usage may take any value in a range. Indeed, our flexible contract design can be
extended to a continuous distribution for the mean usage and still achieve a reasonable performance (see
Section 7). To model information asymmetry, we assume that a customer knows its own mean demand
and thus its type according to its scheduled workload (e.g., due to a data center’s received computing
jobs from its regular subscribers). However, the supplier only knows the distribution h(·), but not the
exact type of a customer. The actual net-demand of a type-mi customer can still deviate from its mean
mi (e.g., unexpected task arrivals or cancellation in a data center). We assume that each customer has a
maximum variation degree ∆ ∈ [0, 1], which is random according to the distribution f(∆). We assume
that, given ∆, the (realized) demand x of a type-mi customer is a random variable with probability
density function ρ(x) in the range [mi(1−∆),mi(1 + ∆)]. Again to model information asymmetry, we
assume that the customer knows ∆ but the supplier only knows the probability density function f(∆).
For ease of exposition as well as analysis tractability, we further make the following assumption 2.1
that each customer’s demand and variation both follow a uniform distribution. Although the uniform
assumption may seem restrictive, it allows us to perform an in-depth study of the problem, and reveal
new insights and non-trivial structure for the interaction between the customers and the supplier. Our
results can be extended to other distributions for customer’s demand and variation without major
change of the revealed engineering insights. The detailed analysis and results are available in Section
7.
Assumption 2.1. Each customer’s demand follows a uniform distribution, that is ρ(x) = 12mi∆ for
x ∈ [mi(1−∆),mi(1 + ∆)], and its variation ∆ follows a uniform distribution in [0, 1].
Our customer model can also incorporate demand elasticity. Facing the realized demand x, a
customer can adjust the demand to x′ (e.g., it can reschedule or reject some computing tasks at some
cost). If x′ < x, i.e., the actual demand is cut down to x′, the customer incurs an elasticity cost
k(x − x′) at unit cost (penalty) k. On the other hand, if x′ > x, the cost can be trivial since the
customer can just turn on more machines or servers.
A customer’s goal is to minimize its overall cost, including both the demand elasticity cost (only if
x′ < x) and the cost to purchase energy from the supplier. The latter depends on the pricing schemes
chosen by the customer, as elaborated below.
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Figure 1: Illustration of a customer’s cost c¯(x′) versus actual demand x′ under type-mi flexible contract
(pi, δi, p¯i).
2.2 Flexible Contracts for Information Revelation
Before proposing the flexible contracts, we first introduce the existing baseline pricing employed by
the supplier. In the baseline pricing scheme, note that the supplier represents the utility, or LSE
(Load Serving Entity), which buys electricity from generators and resells electricity to its customers.
The supplier announces a fixed electricity price p0 > 0 to all customers and a customer’s cost p0x
′ is
proportional to its actual usage x′. To avoid the trivial case that a customer does not purchase any
electricity, we assume p0 < k, which implies that the customer will always decide x
′ = x under the
baseline scheme because using demand elasticity only incurs a higher cost.
With only the baseline pricing scheme, the supplier will have to face significant risk in capacity needs
if the future demand of the customers is high. To address the issue, in addition to the baseline pricing
scheme, the supplier also introduces flexible contracts to encourage customers to indirectly reveal their
private information through their contract choices. Given that there are n types of customers, it is
enough for the supplier to set n contract options, that is one for each type. The contract option
designed for type-mi customers is denoted as (pi, δi, p¯i). If a customer’s actual demand is x
′, its cost
for buying x′ amount of electricity is given by
c¯(x′) =

mi(1− δi)pi, if x′ < mi(1− δi)
x′pi, if x′ ∈ [mi(1− δi),mi(1 + δi)]
x′p¯i +mi(1 + δi)
(
pi − p¯i
)
, if x′ > mi(1 + δi),
which is illustrated in Figure 1. Here, pi < p0 is the discounted energy price if the real demand of
a customer is in the commitment range [mi(1 − δi),mi(1 + δi)], where δi ∈ [0, 1], and p¯i is the unit
penalty (price) for extra demand beyond mi(1 + δi). If the realized demand is below the lower bound
mi(1 − δi), it also incurs a cost that is equivalent to the cost of consuming mi(1 − δi) amount of
electricity.
A customer has a lower cost if its actual demand is in [mi(1 − δi),mi(1 + δi)], and otherwise the
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cost may be higher than the baseline cost. Thus, a type-mi customer will carefully choose the contract
according to its mean usage mi and maximum variation ∆. It should be noted that the customer may
leverage its demand elasticity to cut down the overage demand from x to x′, and this lowers its cost
to c¯(x′) + kmax(x − x′, 0). A customer’s contract choice thus reveals its private information about
internal demand, which is useful for the supplier to provision the capacity.
2.3 The Supplier’s Profit
The supplier’s cost consists of two parts. First, there is an electricity generation cost to meet the
actual total demand of the customers. We assume that the generation cost per unit electricity is c0 as
in [5], which should be smaller than p0. (Otherwise, the supplier’s profit is always negative.) Second,
as the supplier must plan for enough capacity to meet the highest-possible future demand, there is
a capacity cost reflecting the costs for capacity market payment. If the supplier needs y units of
capacity, in general the capacity cost g(y) is increasing in y, since to provide more capacity resource,
more investment on the generating stations is needed.
The above model approximates how the utility, or LSE, pays for capacity in the capacity market
[4, 12]. In the capacity auction, the generators are sellers who offer capacity, while the ISO (Independent
System Operator) sets the demand curve for capacity. The ISO pays the generators for long-term
capacity procured. However, these payments need to eventually be covered by the load serving entities.
Thus, after the capacity auction is completed, the utilities or LSEs pay capacity cost to the ISOs for
every time period (e.g., month) based on their predicted peak demand [12]. We note that this predicted
demand is usually estimated from the peak demand in the previous period. Even if the suppliers (i.e.,
utilities or LSEs) introduce the flexible contracts, current markets do not provide a way for them to
inform their “new” and more accurate peak demand for the upcoming period. Nonetheless, the peak
demand of the upcoming period will eventually impact the suppliers’ capacity costs in the subsequent
period. Thus, the load serving entities or utilities can account for the “new” peak demand in their
design of flexible contracts for the upcoming period since it can reduce its subsequent capacity cost to
the ISO. Further, future market rules may also be revised to incorporate such demand-side information
provided by the suppliers and learned from the flexible contracts.
In the baseline pricing scheme, the supplier does not know a customer’s mean demand m and
variation ∆. Thus, it has to prepare for the worst case when preparing capacity. As the maximum
possible value of mi is mn and the maximum possible variation value of ∆ is 100%, the capacity
prepared for any type-mi customer is 2mn. In the proposed contract, not all type-mi customers will
pick the contract option i. Indeed, a type-mi customer chooses the option i only if the cost choosing
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the option is no larger than that choosing other options or the baseline pricing scheme (see Proposition
3.1). However, once a customer chooses the contract option (pi, δi, p¯i) with a sufficiently high penalty
price p¯i > k, the supplier only needs to provide capacity mi(1+δi) instead of 2mn. For ease of analysis
tractability, we make the following assumption 2.2 that the supplier’s capacity cost is linear with the
amount of capacity prepared in advance, which enables us to reveal new insights. We believe that the
insights under the restrictive assumption could potentially be generalized as well.
Assumption 2.2. The supplier’s capacity cost is linear with the amount of capacity prepared in
advance, that is, g(y) = cˆy.
Besides Assumption 2.2, we assume cˆ ≤ 12p0. Otherwise, the supplier’s profit P0 under the baseline
pricing scheme is negative, which is impractical. To see this, note that
P0 =
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)mip0 − 2Nmncˆ−
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)c0mi, (1)
where we have used the assumption that each customer j = 1, . . . , N will be of type mi with probability
h(mi). If mi < mn and cˆ >
1
2p0, we would have P0 < Nmnp0 − 2Nmncˆ −
∑n
i=1Nh(mi)c0mi < 0,
which is impractical. Finally, since k > p0 as discussed in Section 2.2, we must have k ≥ 2cˆ.
We now provide a mathematical expression for the supplier’s profit (i.e., revenue minus cost) under
the flexible contracts. For each customer j = 1, . . . , N , let m(j) be its mean demand and ∆(j) be its
variation level. Let i(j) be the contract option picked by the j -th customer (as in Section 2.2), and we
use i(j) = 0 for the baseline pricing scheme. Let e(j) be the customer’s expected energy consumption
depending on the chosen contract option, which is calculated by averaging all possible realized demand
x. Let pi(j) be the capacity needed for customer j. With sufficiently high penalty price, i.e., p¯i(j) > k,
we have pi(j) = mi(j)(1+δi(j)) if the customer chooses contract option i(j) 6= 0; Otherwise, pi(j) = 2mn
when choosing the baseline pricing scheme. Let r(j) be the customer’s expected energy payment to
the supplier for buying energy, with the expectation taken over the real demand x. To sum up, the
total profit to the supplier is given by
P (Φ) = E
( N∑
j=1
r(j)− c0
N∑
j=1
e(j)− g[
N∑
j=1
pi(j)]
)
(2)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of each m(j) and ∆(j).
2.4 Problem Formulation for Optimal Contract Design
We now formulate the optimal contract design problem, where contract (pi, δi, p¯i) is designed for type-
mi customers. We use a Stackelberg game to study the interactions between the supplier and the
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n types of customers. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of all possible customer types. As the
Stackelberg leader, the supplier first decides the contract options Φ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I} in Stage I
with the goal to maximize its expected profit. Note that the baseline price p0 is not a decision variable
for the supplier, as our focus is the contract design for any given p0. After that, each customers chooses
either the baseline pricing scheme or a particular flexible contract to minimize its cost in Stage II.
We note that it is non-trivial to design the contract parameters δi, pi and p¯i. If δi is too small,
it imposes too much restriction on the customers’ future demand, discouraging many customers to
participate in the contracts and to reveal their demand information. If δi is too large, the supplier
only learns coarse information on each customer’s variation, and thus cannot benefit from capacity
reduction. The choice of pi also has a tradeoff. While a low price stimulates high subscription rate
from customers and helps information learning for saving capacity, it provides low energy revenue
to the supplier. The choice of penalty price p¯i has a similar tradeoff as pi. Next, we introduce a
contract formulation that captures the tradeoffs. According to the revelation principle [13][14], it is
sufficient to focus on incentive-compatible design of the contract options, which requires each customer
to truthfully choose the contract option designed for its own type. Specifically, for a type-mi customer
with variation ∆, we denote its expected cost when choosing the baseline pricing as E[C0(mi,∆)] and
denote its expected cost when choosing the type-mj contract as E[Cj(mi,∆)]. Then, the incentive
compatibility requirement can be expressed as follows.
Definition 2.3. A contract Φ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I} satisfies the incentive compatibility (IC) condition
if
for any two types i 6= j, and any ∆ ∈ [0, 1],
min{E[Ci(mi,∆)],mip0} ≤ min{E[Cj(mi,∆)],mip0}.
(3)
In other words, if IC condition holds, a customer of type-mi will either pick its dedicated contract
for type-mi or the baseline. Picking any other contract option j 6= i will not yield lower cost for a
type-mi customer.
Our goal is then
max
Φ
P (Φ) = E
( N∑
j=1
r(j)− c0
N∑
j=1
e(j)− g[
N∑
j=1
pi(j)]
)
, (4)
subject to (3) and
pi ≤ p0, and δi ∈ [0, 1], for any i ∈ I. (5)
We will refer to Problem (4) as Problem P1 in the rest of the paper. To solve the optimal contract
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Table 1:
Notations Definitions
N Number of customers
n Number of contract options
mi Mean demand of a type-mi customer
h(mi) Probability that a customer is of type-mi
∆ Variation degree of a customer’s demand
f(∆) Probability density function of ∆
ρ(x) Probability density function of a customer’s demand
k Elasticity cost coefficient of customers
p0 Baseline price
pi Discounted price in the contract option i
δi Contract option i’s variation range size
p¯i Penalty in the contract option i
c0 Unit electricity generation cost of supplier
g(y) Cost function of supplier for reserving capacity y
cˆ Unit capacity cost of the supplier where g(y) is linear
Φ A contract
Φ′ Final contract in the optimistic scenario
Φ′′ Final contract in the pessimistic scenario
E[Cj(mi,∆)] Type-mi customer’s cost choosing contract option j
P Supplier’s profit under flexible contracts
P0 Supplier’s profit under baseline pricing scheme
P ∗ Supplier’s optimal profit under Problem P1
PHi Supplier’s profit under high penalty regime
PLi Supplier’s profit under low penalty regime
Pˆ ∗ Supplier’s super-optimal profit
∆th,i Variation degree threshold
design problem, we face two key challenges.
• Challenge I: Tractability. The nonlinear IC condition in (3) is not a convex set and the objective
is not concave (as will be shown in Section 3). Hence, the problem is intractable for a large
number of customer types.
• Challenge II: Robust Contract Design. Prior literature on contract design using a similar IC
condition assumes the optimistic setting: when a customer faces more than one contract options
with the same cost, it will always pick its dedicated contract option, which is also the one
most favorable to the supplier [14][15][17]. However, this assumption may not hold in practice
considering customers’ selfish or adverse behavior.
We will present our solutions to deal with both challenges in Sections 4 and 5.
For ease of reading, we first list the notations in Table I, which are used in this section as well as
the next several sections.
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3 Detailed Formulation of Problem P1
In this section, we derive detailed expressions for Problem P1. Note that P1 is actually a bi-level
optimization problem. We will use backward induction to first analyze a customer’s option choice in
Stage II, and then derive the supplier’s profit in Stage I for optimal contract design.
3.1 Customers’ Decisions in Stage II
We first analyze a type-mi customer’s expected cost E[Ci(mi,∆)] when it chooses the dedicated con-
tract option i. Its choice depends on its demand variation ∆ and the contract’s committed variation
δi. If ∆ < δi, the customer’s demand is always within the contract range and its expected cost is
E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mipi. On the other hand, if ∆ > δi, its expected cost is larger because its random de-
mand may exceed the commitment range. Recall that the future demand is x ∈ [mi(1−∆),mi(1+∆))]
with the probability density function ρ(x). The customer’s cost also depends on whether it employs
the demand elasticity to change realized demand x to actual demand x′. Specifically, the customer
will decide x′ in the following way:
• If x ∈ [mi(1+δi),mi(1+∆)], the customer will leverage elasticity to reduce demand to mi(1+δi)
only if k < p¯i. If k ≥ p¯i, the customer will keep the original demand x and undertake the contract
penalty.
• If x ∈ [mi(1− δi),mi(1 + δi)], the customer will not change realized demand but request x from
the supplier due to pi < k.
• When x ∈ [mi(1−∆),mi(1− δi)], the customer with insufficient demand will leverage elasticity
to increase its demand to x′ = mi(1− δi) without incurring any additional cost1.
By considering all possible x, we can compute the expected cost for a type-mi customer with variability
degree ∆ > δi if it chooses the contract option i. This expression depends on the relationship between
k and p¯i. If p¯i > k, we have
E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mipi +
mik
4∆
(∆− δi)2. (6)
We can see that, the cost increases with demand variation ∆ and elasticity cost coefficient k. As a
special case, E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mipi when ∆ = δi. Otherwise, if p¯i ≤ k, we similarly have E[Ci(mi,∆)] =
mipi +
mip¯i
4∆ (∆− δi)2 by replacing k in (6) by p¯i.
Similarly, we can analyze the expected cost E[Cj(mi,∆)] of a type-mi customer by choosing another
contract option j, by considering the relationship between ranges [mi(1−∆),mi(1 + ∆)] and [mj(1−
1The customer (e.g., a data center) can easily activate more servers to keep demand at the promised lower bound
mi(1− δi). The incurred cost is trivial.
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δj),mj(1 + δj)]. As there are many combination cases, here we skip the detailed analysis, and provide
them in the Appendix.
Under the IC condition in (3), a customer will either choose its own contract type or the baseline
pricing whichever’s cost is lower. Assuming that the IC condition holds, we can derive the customers’
optimal behavior as follows. As described earlier, we only focus on k > p0.
Proposition 3.1. At Stage II, observing the supplier’s contract option (pi, δi, p¯i) and the baseline
price p0, type-mi customers are partitioned into the following two groups, depending on their variation
distribution of ∆ ∈ [0, 1]:
• Customers of low variation (i.e., ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i]) will subscribe to contract option i to take advan-
tage of price discount, where variation degree threshold ∆th,i depends on the relationship between
k and p¯i as follows.
– High penalty regime (p¯i > k):
∆th,i = min
(
1, [kδi + 2(p0 − pi)
+
√
(kδi + 2(p0 − pi))2 − k2δ2i ]/k
)
, (7)
which is independent of p¯i.
– Low penalty regime (p¯i ≤ k):
∆th,i = min
(
1, [p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi)
+
√
(p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi))2 − p¯2i δ2i ]/p¯i
)
, (8)
which is independent of k.
• Customers of high variation (i.e., ∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1]) will subscribe to the baseline scheme to avoid
the high over-usage penalty if p¯i > k) or high elasticity cost if p¯i ≤ k.
Moreover, ∆th,i is nonincreasing in k for k > p0.
The intuition behind Proposition 3.1 is as follows. If a type-mi customer has a small variation
∆, a large fraction of its demand range is within the contract option i’s discounted price range so
that it takes advantage of discounted price. Thus, its total expected cost when choosing option i is
smaller than that choosing baseline pricing. Otherwise, if it has a large variation, a large fraction of
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its demand range exceeds the upper bound of the contract option i’s discounted price range and incurs
high penalty or elasticity cost. Thus, its total expected cost when choosing option i is larger than
that choosing baseline pricing. In addition, it is interesting to see that ∆th,i is nonincreasing with
k. The underlying reason is as follows. When k is small, the contract option i is in the high penalty
regime (i.e., k < p¯i). In this penalty regime, ∆th,i is decreasing in k. To see this, note that customers
with medium variation (e.g., δi ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆th,i) will choose option i. As k increases, the expected cost
of these customers increases. As a result, some of them will switch to the baseline pricing scheme,
and ∆th,i will decrease. After k exceeds p¯i, the contract option i enters the low penalty regime (i.e.,
k ≥ p¯i). Thus, ∆th,i remains constant as k grows, since customers do not exercise costly elasticity and
the expected cost of the customers with medium variation is independent of k.
Sketch of Proof: To prove Proposition 3.1, let E[Ci(mi,∆)] = E[C0(mi,∆)]. Solving the quadratic
equation with only one variable ∆, we get the variation degree threshold ∆th,i. Since E[Ci(mi,∆)]
is increasing in ∆, and E[C0(mi,∆)] is constant at mip0, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤ E[C0(mi,∆)] for
∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i], and E[Ci(mi,∆)] > E[C0(mi,∆)]for ∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1].
3.2 The supplier’s Profit in Stage I
Based on customers’ decision in Section 3.1, we now show that the IC condition can simplify the
supplier’s profit in (2).
For each customer j = 1, . . . , N , it will be of type mi with probability h(mi). Recall Assumption 2.1
that ∆ follows a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. According to Proposition 3.1, under the IC condition,
it will pick contract i with probability ∆th,i and the baseline scheme with probability 1−∆th,i. The
supplier’s (expected) profit from type-mi customers depends on whether contract option i has high or
low penalty.
We first consider the supplier’s (expected) profit PHi from type-mi customers if contract option
i has high penalty. Note that, regardless of a type-mi customer’s choice between contract option i
and baseline pricing scheme, its expected energy consumption is always e(j) = mi. Thus, the energy
cost to the supplier is always c0mi. Further, if it picks the option i, its maximum consumption is
pi(j) = mi(1 + δi) and its energy consumption payment is r(j) = mipi. Otherwise, if it picks the
baseline scheme, its maximum possible consumption is pi(j) = 2mn (because the supplier does not its
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type), and its energy payment is r(j) = mip0. Thus, we have
PHi = Nh(mi)
((
mipi∆th,i +mip0(1−∆th,i)
)− c0mi
−cˆ(mi(1 + δi)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i))). (9)
Similarly, we can model the supplier’s (expected) profit PLi from type-mi customers if contract
option i has low penalty. Compared to the above high penalty cost, if a type-mi customer j picks the
option i, its maximum consumption is pi(j) = mi(1 + ∆th,i) instead of mi(1 + δi). Also, if its variation
∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i], its energy consumption payment is mipi+ mip¯i4∆ (∆−δi)2 instead of mipi, and its energy
consumption is mi
(
1
4∆ +
δ2i
4∆ + 1− 12δi
)
instead of mi. Thus, we have
PLi = Nh(mi)
(∫ δi
0
mipid∆ +
∫ ∆th,i
δi
(
mipi
+
mip¯i
4∆
(∆− δi)2
)
d∆ + (1−∆th,i)mip0
−cˆ(mi(1 + ∆th,i)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− Ce(mi)),
where
Ce(mi) = mic0
(
δi + 1−∆th,i + 1
8
(∆2th,i − δ2i )
+
δ2i
4
ln
∆th,i
δi
+ (1− 1
2
δi)(∆th,i − δi)
)
. (10)
Thus, P (Φ) in (2) can be rewritten as
P (Φ) =
∑
i∈IH
PHi +
∑
i∈IL
PLi , (11)
where IH is the set of contract options with high penalty, and IL is the set of contract options with
low penalty.
Thus, Problem P1 is to maximize P (Φ) in (11) subject to (3) and (5).
Proposition 3.1 narrows the supplier’s attentions to only those customers with small ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i].
By substituting (6) and the expressions of E[Cj(mi,∆)] to the IC constraints, we can find that the
constraints are non-convex. To see this, consider E[Cj(mi,∆)] = mj(1 − δj)pj when mi(1 + ∆) <
mj(1− δj) as an illustrative example. It involves the product term (1− δj)pj , which is neither convex
nor concave in decision variables δj and pj . In addition, the objective is not concave since it involves
the product term pi∆th,i in (9), which is not jointly concave in decision variables pi and ∆th,i. As
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a result, the optimal contract-design problem (4) becomes intractable especially when the number of
customer types n is large. In the next section, we will show how to overcome this analysis difficulty
and develop approximate solution with provable performance guarantees.
4 Approach for Solving P1’s Challenge I
To address Challenge I for solving Problem P1, we define a new Problem P2. Problem P2 has the same
objective as Problem P1. Its constraint on the optimization variables (pi, δi, p¯i,∆th,i) in (3) is reduced
to the set
Rˆ = {∀i ∈ I, (pi, δi, p¯i,∆th,i)|∀i ∈ I, pi = p0,
0 ≤ δi = ∆th,i ≤ 1, p¯i > k}. (12)
The intuition behind choosing the smaller set Rˆ is as follows. First, it sets a high penalty, i.e., p¯i > k
to motivate customers to use their flexibility to reduce load, which saves both their own costs and the
supplier’s capacity cost. Further, we hypothesize that the contract price should not be significantly
lower than the baseline price. Otherwise, the supplier will lose a significant amount of revenue in these
flexible contracts. Assuming pi ≈ p0, we have δi ≈ ∆th,i by the equation (7). The set Rˆ essentially
looks at the case when the above two approximations exactly hold. This scenario of restricting to
Rˆ is useful for the following reasons. To see this, first, under Rˆ, each type-mi customer’s payment
is always mip0, no matter it chooses the baseline or the flexible contract. As a result, the supplier’s
total revenue is also at the maximum. Second, under this restricted scenario, the supplier can still
significantly save the capacity cost, because those customers with ∆ ≤ δi will choose the contract
option. Due to the above reasons, we expect that the solution to Problem P2 will produce a reasonable
approximate solution to Problem P1.
However, readers will immediately notice that, in set Rˆ, for customer with small ∆ ≤ δi, choosing
its dedicated contract option will produce exactly the same cost as choosing the baseline. Furthermore,
it is also possible that the costs to a customer are the same across multiple contract options (i.e., all
equal to mip0), especially when the mean of these options are close to each other. An issue that
immediately arises is why the customer would choose its dedicated contract option in the first place.
This question will be the key issue for the next Section 5. For this current section, we focus on the easier
case that, as long as the IC condition holds, the customer with small ∆ ≤ δi will choose its dedicated
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contract option even when its cost is the same as the baseline or under other contract options. We
will then uncover some important structures of the solution that will also be useful later on.
Proposition 4.1. In Problem P2, the supplier’s optimal contract design Φ′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I|pi =
p0, δi = ∆th,i, i ∈ I} is of a simple form as follows, depending on the diversity of customers’ types and
is incentive compatible:
• If type mi is close to mn (i.e., mnmi ≤ 32), the optimal contract option i for this type is (p0, mnmi −
1
2 , p¯i > k);
• If type mi is not close to type-mn (i.e., mnmi > 32), the optimal contract option i is (p0, 1, p¯i > k).
The intuition behind the optimal contract design in Proposition 4.1 is as follows. Recall that in
the set Rˆ, the payment of each customer to the supplier is always mipi = mip0, regardless of whether
it chooses the contract or the baseline. Hence, the benefit to the supplier mainly comes from the
reduced capacity cost, which can be studied separately for each customer. Under the baseline pricing
scheme, the capacity that the supplier has to provision for each customer is always 2mn. Thus, if mi
is much lower than mn, enticing the customers to use the contract will lead to much lower capacity
requirement, which is 2mi if δi = 1. As a result, it is beneficial to set δi = 1 so that all type-mi
customers are willing to pick the contract. However, if mi is relatively close to mn, the supplier faces
the following tradeoff: if δi is high, the capacity reduction for each customer is small; if δi is low, very
few customers will choose the contract option due to strict commitment. Neither extreme is good for
the supplier to reduce the provisioned capacity. Hence, the value of δi needs to be optimized. This
optimal δi turns out to be
mn
mi
− 12 , which balances the above tradeoff.
Sketch of Proof: To prove Proposition 4.1, note that the profit from each type of customers can
be calculated separately in Problem P2. To solve the optimal contract in Problem P2, it suffices to
maximize PHi in (9) subject to pi = p0, 0 ≤ ∆th,i = δi ≤ 1. To do this, we replace pi by p0, and ∆th,i
by δi in (9). Through this simplification, P
H
i becomes a quadratic function with only one variable δi.
We can then optimize the choice of δi easily.
Remark: We see that the approximate contract in Proposition 4.1 is independent of the distribution
of h(mi). This independence is due to the restriction of the approximate contract to Rˆ in Problem
P2. To see this, note that for any contract under Rˆ, each contract option is independent with the
other options. Thus, to solve the approximate contract, it suffices to solve each option separately in
the optimal contract for the new Problem P2 where each option is independent of the distribution of
h(mi). In contrast, note that for any contract satisfying the IC condition (3) of the optimal contract
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design problem P1, each contract option is restricted by other options. Thus, the optimal contract
depends on the distribution of h(mi).
To evaluate the performance of approximate contract Φ′ in Proposition 4.1, we define the following
gain ratio P (X)−P0P∗−P0 for any contract X. Here, P0 is the supplier’s traditional profit under the baseline
pricing scheme in (1), P (X) is the supplier’s profit under contract design X, and P ∗ is the supplier’s
optimal profit in the original Problem P1. The gain ratio tells us how closely the approximate solution
can approach the performance gain of the optimal contract over the baseline scheme.
Proposition 4.2. The gain ratio of contract Φ′ in Proposition 4.1 is at least 12 .
Proposition 4.2 illustrates the good performance of Φ′. The intuition behind this proposition is
that, at solution Φ′, the supplier collects the maximum amount of revenue. Although the supplier’s
profit at solution Φ′ is lower than the optimal, the difference can be bounded. The proof uses similar
ideas as the proof of Theorem 5.5 in Section 5. Since these ideas will be presented in Section 5, we
omit the details here.
5 Approach for solving P1’s Challenge II
We now turn to Challenge II, which is against the IC condition itself. Note that the IC condition
implicitly assumes an optimistic scenario. That is, when the costs of more than one contract option
(including baseline pricing option) are equal, the customer will pick the dedicated option designed
by the supplier, which is usually most favorable to the supplier. Although this optimistic scenario is
widely assumed in the mechanism design literature [14][15][17], it may fail in practice. Indeed, the
customer may pick the option least favorable to the supplier, which we refer to as the pessimistic
setting.
To illustrate this issue, consider the approximate contract Φ′ in Proposition IV.1 designed for the
optimistic scenario. For type-mi customer with small ∆ ≤ δi, choosing its dedicated contract option
i will produce exactly the same cost mip0 as choosing the baseline. Under the optimistic scenario,
it is assumed that the customer chooses option i, and the resulting capacity need is mi(1 + δi).
However, in practice, the customer may choose the baseline, which results in a larger capacity need
2mn. Furthermore, it is also possible that the costs to a customer are the same across multiple contract
options (i.e., all equal to mip0), especially when the mean of these options are close to each other.
Under the pessimistic setting, a type-mi customer may choose option j > i, which is dedicated for
type-mj customers with larger mean demand. As a result, the capacity need is larger than that if
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the customer chooses its dedicated option i under the optimistic scenario. Hence, in practice, the
approximate contract Φ′ may result in poor performance due to customers’ selfish behaviors that are
unfavorable for the supplier.
In this section, we will relax this strict IC condition and quantify the pessimistic or worst-case
performance when a customer (facing more than one contract yielding the same benefit) may not pick
the option that is the most favorable to the supplier.
Now we will present our approach to quantify the worst-case performance. We start from the
contract Φ′ to Problem P2 as described in Proposition 4.1, but reduce all the contract prices from
baseline price p0 by  > 0. This is to ensure that, for customers with ∆ < ∆th,i given in (7),
choosing contracts are strictly better off than choosing the baseline scheme. For those customers with
∆ = ∆th,i, there is still ambiguity whether they will choose the contracts. However, they are of a
probability measure of 0 and hence do not affect the supplier’s cost.
Definition 5.1. In the pessimistic scenario, we define contract Φ′′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I} below, which
depends on the diversity of customers’ types:
• If type mi is close to type-mn (i.e., mnmi ≤ 32), contract option i is (p0 − , mnmi − 12 , p¯i > k).
• If type mi is much smaller than type-mn (i.e., mnmi > 32), contract option i is (p0 − , 1, p¯i > k).
Still, among the contract options Φ′′ with the identical price p0 − , a customer may face the same
cost when choosing between two different options and it may not choose the one preferred by the
supplier. Different from the mechanism design literature, our approach allows such untruthful option
selection that allows a customer to choose a contract option different from its type.
To evaluate the performance of Φ′′, we analyze the profit of the supplier under Φ′′ in the pessimistic
setting. Consider a type-mi customer with variation ∆. If ∆ > ∆th,i with ∆th,i given in (7), it will
choose the baseline pricing and the supplier’s profit from such a customer is s0(mi,∆) = mip0−2mncˆ−
c0mi. On the other hand, if ∆ < ∆th,i, it will choose one of the contract options. If it chooses contract
option j, let sj(mi,∆) be the supplier’s profit from a type-mi customer with variation ∆. For example,
if a type-mi customer with ∆ ≤ ∆th,i subscribes to option i, its contribution to the supplier’s profit is
si(mi,∆) = mipi − cˆmi(1 + δi)− c0mi. However, it is still possible that E[Cj(mi,∆)] = E[Ci(mi,∆)]
if the customer chooses another option j. Under the pessimistic setting, the customer chooses the
contract option i∗(mi,∆) that results in the lowest profit to the supplier in the worst case. Thus, the
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supplier’s (minimum) expected profit from all customers is
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)
( ∫ ∆th,i
0
f(∆)si∗(mi,∆)(mi,∆)d∆
+
∫ 1
∆th,i
f(∆)s0(mi,∆)d∆
)
. (13)
In the following, we will use the objective (13) for the supplier in the pessimistic setting instead of
(11).
To quantify the performance guarantee, we divide our analysis into three steps.
5.1 Step 1
We first determine an upper bound of the optimal profit P ∗. This upper bound is needed as the
optimal profit of Problem P1 is difficult to solve directly. We derive this upper bound by removing
constraint (3) of Problem P1. We refer to the resulting optimal contract design as the “super-optimal”.
Lemma 5.2. By removing constraint (3) of Problem P1, the super-optimal contract Φˆ is given as
follows.
• When the type mi does not differ greatly from type-mn (i.e., mnmi ≤ k−cˆk + 12), the contract option
(pi, δi, p¯i) is pi = p0 − cˆ22(k−cˆ) ( 2mnmi − 1), δi = k−2cˆ2(k−cˆ) ( 2mnmi − 1), and with arbitrarily high penalty
p¯i > k. In this case, only type-mi customers of low variation (∆ ≤ ∆th,i = k2(k−cˆ) ( 2mnmi −1)) < 1)
will choose the contract. The optimal profit collected from type-mi customers is
E(Pi) = Nh(mi)(mip0 −mic0 − 2mncˆ+ kcˆ(2mn −mi)
2
4mi(k − cˆ) ).
• When the type mi differs greatly from type-mn (i.e., mnmi > k−cˆk + 12), the contract option is
(pi, δi, p¯i) with pi = p0 − cˆ2k , δi = 1− 2cˆk , p¯i > k. All type-mi customers will choose the contract
(∆th,i = 1). The optimal profit collected from type-mi customers is
E(Pi) = Nh(mi)(mip0 −mic0 − 2micˆ+ micˆ
2
k
).
Moreover, the supplier’s super-optimal profit Pˆ ∗, which is the sum of the super-optimal profit from all
customers, is decreasing in k.
Lemma 5.2 has a similar structure as Proposition 4.1 yet it has another dimension of freedom for
deciding the contract price pi. The underlying intuition is also similar: without the IC condition, the
profit contributed by each customer can again be separately optimized. The results can be interpreted
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as follows. If mi is much lower than mn, enticing the customers to use the contract will lead to much
lower capacity requirement (mi(1 + δi) ≤ 2mi ≤ 2mn). Thus, it is beneficial to set δi = 1− 2cˆk so that
∆th,i = 1. However, if mi is relatively close to mn, the supplier again faces the following tradeoff: if
δi is high, the capacity reduction for each customer is small; if δi is low, very few customers choose
contract options. It turns out the best δi is
k−2cˆ
2(k−cˆ) (
2mn
mi
− 1), which balances the above tradeoff. The
last part of the lemma states that the super-optimal profit is decreasing in k. This property is intuitive
because as k increases, the cost of a customer with medium variation ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] increases, which
may push them out of the contract. As a result, fewer customers will choose contract options and the
supplier saves less capacity cost. This increasing property turns out to be quite crucial later on.
Sketch of Proof: To prove Lemma 5.2, we will prove that at the super-optimality, the supplier
only determines a high penalty , i.e., p¯i > k for each contract option i. This allows us to only focus
on the high penalty regime of each contract option to solve the super-optimum. Note that the profit
from each type of customers can be calculated separately. To solve the super-optimum, it suffices to
maximize PHi in (9) subject to (5) and the equation of high penalty regime in (7). To do this, we
replace pi in (9) by δi,∆th,i according to the equation of high penalty regime in (7). Through this
simplification, PHi is now concave with either ∆th,i or δi, but not both jointly. Fortunately, we can
sequentially optimize the choice of δi for a fixed ∆th,i, then optimize the one-variable ∆th,i.
5.2 Step 2
Next, we focus on the limiting regime when  → 0+, and show that the approximation ratio of the
solution Φ′′ in Definition 5.1 is no smaller than 13 . Note that when  → 0+, the solution Φ′′ in
Definition 5.1 is virtually the same as solution Φ′ in Proposition 4.1 for the optimistic setting. The
only difference is that the supplier’s profit P (Φ′) is calculated by (13) in the pessimistic setting instead
of by (11) in the optimistic setting. As in Proposition 4.2, we are interested in the lower bound of the
performance gain ratio between Φ′ and the optimal. Towards this end, it suffices to compare P (Φ′)
with the super-optimal. The term P (Φ
′)−P0
Pˆ∗−P0 provides a lower bound on the gain ratio between the
solution Φ′ and the super-optimal, which will be shown in Lemma 5.3.
Lemma 5.3. The lower bound of the gain ratio between Φ′ under pessimistic setting and the super
optimal is at least 13 .
The intuition behind Lemma 5.3 is as follows. On the one hand, if the customers’ mean demands
are close to each other, the profit loss due to pessimistic contract selection is not significant. On the
other hand, if customers’ mean demands differ a lot, it is more unlikely for customers to choose other
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contract options. As a result, the total profit loss is also limited. By Lemma 5.3, the contract solution
of Definition 5.1 when → 0+ achieves an approximation ratio at least 13 .
Sketch of Proof: To prove Lemma 5.3, it suffices to consider the case when k is minimum at k = 2cˆ,
since the super-optimal profit decreases in k as shown in Lemma 5.2. In this extreme, the super-optimal
solution simplifies to δi = 0,∆th,i = 1, pi = p0 − 12 cˆ,∀i ∈ I by Lemma 5.2, and the expression for the
gain of the super-optimal solution compared with the baseline can be calculated as a function of h(mi)
and mi. Also, we can calculate the expression for the gain of solution Φ
′ as a function of h(mi) and
mi under pessimistic setting. Putting the above expressions together, we can show that the gain ratio
between solution Φ′ and the super-optimal solution is no smaller than 13 .
5.3 Step 3
Finally, we show that by increasing  in a controllable manner, there exist feasible solutions Φ′′ near
Φ′ that only increases the supplier’s profit in Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 5.4. There exists an 0 > 0 such that for all 0 <  < 0, the contract Φ
′′ (which is near Φ′)
is feasible in satisfying (3) and (5), and the supplier’s profit under these solutions is no smaller than
that at → 0+.
Sketch of Proof: To prove Lemma 5.4, we first show that there exist feasible solutions Φ′′ (as
defined in Definition 5.1), that satisfy the IC condition. Then, to prove that the supplier’s profit under
these feasible solutions is no smaller than that at  → 0+, we only need to prove that the derivative
of the supplier’s profit with respect to  is positive at  → 0+. The intuition behind this property is
that lower contract price attracts more customers to subscribe to contract options. As a result, the
supplier can estimate customers’ total capacity more accurately and reduce its total capacity cost.
Combining the above three steps, we conclude the result in Theorem 5.5.
Theorem 5.5. There exists an 0 > 0 such that for all 0 <  < 0, the contract Φ
′′ is feasible in
satisfying (3) and (5) and attains an gain ratio at least 13 under the pessimistic setting.
6 Numerical Results
In this section, we first evaluate the empirical performance of our proposed contract design Φ′′, and
then compare the flexible contract to a typical pricing scheme: the peak-based pricing scheme.
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6.1 Empirical Gain Ratio of the Flexible Contract Φ′′
As shown in Section 5, the lower bound of the gain ratio of our proposed flexible contract Φ′′ is 13 ,
which represents its worst-case performance. However, in most settings, the gain ratio is higher than
this lower bound. It is thus interesting to examine the average-case and median-case gain ratio of the
flexible contract Φ′′, since they reflect the gain ratio in a common setting.
Consider an example where there are only two types of customers. Figure 2 shows how the average-
case and median-case gain ratio changes as m2m1 and the unit capacity cost cˆ vary. To vary the ratio
m2
m1
, we fix m1 = 1MWh and vary m2. We set  = 0.001p0 in the flexible contract Φ
′′. Given the values
of m2m1 and cˆ, we generate other parameters (i.e., k, h(m1), h(m2)) randomly and compute the average
and median gain ratio. It is shown that the average and median gain ratio is much larger than the
lower bound 13 . This is because the lower bound only occurs at some extreme case (e.g., k = 2cˆ), which
seldom occurs under the randomly generated parameters. In addition, for a given m2m1 , the average and
median gain ratio decrease as cˆ increases. The reason is that as cˆ increases, the saving due to reduced
capacity needs is greater. Thus, the flexible contract has a larger gain compared to the baseline pricing
scheme.
6.2 Comparison to the Peak-based Pricing Scheme
Next, we compare the flexible contract with the peak-based pricing scheme in the literature. We
consider one month since the supplier often pays capacity cost for an entire month each time. For
simplicity, we consider four time-slots t1, t2, t3, t4, each of which can be viewed as representing a typical
week of a particular type (e.g., busy period vs. idle period). Each time-slot thus contains L = 24×7 =
168 hours. There are two types of customer at each time-slot. We assume that each customer’s mean
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demand at time-slot ti can take values m1(ti),m2(ti) with probability h(ti,m1), h(ti,m2), respectively.
In the peak-based pricing scheme, the supplier sets a base energy price pE and a peak demand price
pD (pD > pE). Note that pE is the amount of price per energy consumption (e.g., in MWh) while
pD is the amount of price per peak power (e.g., in MW). If a customer’s real energy consumption at
time-slot ti is xi, then the total payment of the customer to the supplier is p
E
∑4
i=1 xi + p
D maxi(xi)
L .
We first explain why we expect our flexible contract to outperform the peak-based pricing scheme.
At a high level, although a high demand charge pD will force the customers to reduce its peak,
the extent to which the peak can be reduced depends on the value of k, pE , pD. For example, if
k− pE < pDL < 2k− 2pE , then each customer will only reduce its peak to the second highest demand.
Further, the peak-based pricing does not provide a way for the supplier to learn the demand of the
customers. In contrast, in our flexible contract, the supplier sets a baseline price p0 ≤ k for all four time-
slots t1, t2, t3, t4, and additionally sets two contract options (p1(ti), δ1(ti), p¯1(ti)), (p2(ti), δ2(ti), p¯2(ti))
at each slot ti according to Φ
′′ in Theorem 5.5. Thus, each customer can choose whether to reduce
demand in every time-slot, and the supplier will be able to learn the capacity needs by the contract
selected by the customers. As a result, we expect cost-savings to both the supplier and the customers,
provided that the flexible contracts are properly designed.
Consider an example where m1(t1) = 1MWh, m1(t2) = 2MWh, m1(t3) = 3MWh, m1(t4) = 4MWh,
h(t1,m1) = 0.5, h(t1,m2) = 0.5, h(t2,m1) = 0.6, h(t2,m2) = 0.4, h(t3,m1) = 0.55, h(t3,m2) = 0.45,
h(t4,m1) = 0.5, h(t4,m2) = 0.5, k = 70$/MWh, N = 10. We assume that the base energy price
pE and the peak demand price pD are pE = 49.16$/MWh, pD = 5258$/MW 2. We assume that the
unit energy cost is c0 = 10.98$/MWh as in [19]. In the flexible contract, we set a baseline price as
p0 = 1.4p
E to balance the benefits of the supplier and each customer, and  = 0.01p0 in the flexible
contract Φ′′. (Otherwise, if p0 is too small, the supplier’s profit is too low, and if p0 is too large,
each customer’s cost is too high.), Figure 3 shows how the ratio between the supplier’s profit under
the flexible contract and that under the peak-based pricing changes with cˆ and m2m1 . We can observe
that the ratio is in general larger than 1, especially when cˆ and m2m1 are both very large. The results
thus suggest that the flexible contract enables the supplier to learn valuable demand information of
customers and significantly save its capacity cost by slightly sacrificing its revenue. In addition, we
see that the ratio increases with cˆ and m2m1 . The reason is that, as cˆ or
m2
m1
increases, the capacity cost
and the need to identify customer’s type play a more important role in the supplier’s profit. Hence,
the relative advantage of the flexible contract over peak-based pricing becomes more significant. We
2Note that it is common for the demand charge of one hour of peak demand to be comparable with the energy charge
of over 100 hours at the same power level [18].
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find that the customer’s mean cost reduces under the flexible contract (results not shown due to space
constraints), achieving a win-win situation.
7 Extension to More General Assumptions
In this section, we will relax the previous assumptions of our model to more general cases and show
that our results are still useful under more general assumptions.
7.1 Truncated Normal Distribution for Each Customer’s Variation
Now we show that our analysis and results also apply to other distribution for each customer’s demand
variation. Consider the case when each customer’s variation ∆ ∈ [0, 1] follows a normal distribution
with mean µ and variance σ2, respectively, truncated to [0, 1]. We choose truncated normal distribution
since it can capture a wide range of distributions under different mean and variance values. Similar
to the analysis in Section 4, type-mi customers with low variation (i.e., ∆ ≤ ∆th,i) will subscribe to
contract option i, and type-mi customers of high variation will subscribe to the baseline scheme, where
∆th,i is the same as (7) and (8). The supplier’s expected profit P
H
i from type-mi customers if option
i has high penalty (i.e., p¯i > k) is
PHi = Nh(mi)
((
mipiF +mip0(1− F )
)− c0mi − cˆ(mi(1 + δi)F + 2mn(1− F ))), (14)
where F =
erf(
∆th,i−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
is the cumulative distribution function of the truncated normal dis-
tribution, representing the probability of a customer to have ∆ ≤ ∆th,i. Note that the function
erf(x) = 1√
2pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt is the error function of the standard normal distribution. We see that PHi
above in (14) has a similar structure with that in (9). The difference is that the term ∆th,i in (9) is
replaced by F in (14).
Since it is challenging to find the optimal contract, similar to the analysis in Section 4, we will find
an approximate contract in the set Rˆ defined in (12). To find the approximate contract with good
performance, we will maximize PHi in (14) subject to pi = p0, 0 ≤ ∆th,i = δi ≤ 1. To do this, we
replace pi by p0, and ∆th,i by δi in (14). Through this simplification, P
H
i becomes a function with
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only one variable δi as follows.
PHi = Nh(mi)
(
mip0 − c0mi − cˆ
(
mi(1 + δi)F + 2mn(1− F )
))
= Nh(mi)
(
mip0 − c0mi − cˆ
(
2mn +mi(1 + δi − 2mn
mi
)
erf( δi−µ√
2σ
)− erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)− erf( −µ√
2σ
)
))
.
To maximize PHi over δi, it suffices to minimize (1 + δ− 2mnmi )
erf(
δi−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
over δi. Thus, the final
approximate contract is as follows. Recall that Problem P2 is defined in Section 4.
Proposition 7.1. In Problem P2, the supplier’s optimal contract design is Φ′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I|pi =
p0, δi = arg minδ∈[0,1](1 + δ − 2mnmi )
erf( δ−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
, p¯i > k, i ∈ I}, which is incentive compatible.
Since the function (1+δ− 2mnmi )
erf( δ−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
has a complex form with respect to δ, it is difficult
to solve the closed-form expression for δi. Instead, we optimize the choice of δi by one dimensional
search.
We see that the value of δi in the approximate contract is not the same as that in Proposition
4.1. We can study how the value of δi in the approximate contract is impacted by the diversity of
customers’ types, and the type of the truncated normal distribution in terms of the mean µ and the
standard deviation σ. First, we fix σ = 0.5, and vary the ratio mnmi and µ, which reflects the diversity
of customer’s types. Figure 4 shows how optimal δi in the approximate contract changes with
mn
mi
and
µ. Afterwards, we fix µ = 0.5, and vary the ratio mnmi and σ. Figure 5 shows how δi in the approximate
contract changes with mnmi and σ. In both figures, we see that δi in the approximate contract is non-
decreasing with mnmi . Specifically, if
mn
mi
is smaller than a threshold value, δi is smaller than 1. If
mn
mi
is larger than the threshold value, δi is equal to 1. This threshold-based insight is the same as that
revealed in Proposition 4.1. The difference is that the threshold value varies at different µ and σ in
the setting of normal distribution of ∆ while the threshold value is a constant of 32 in the setting of
uniform distribution of ∆.
To evaluate the performance of the approximate contract, we compare the gains of the approximate
contract and the upper bound of the optimal contract. Similar to Section 5, we obtain the upper bound
by purposely removing constraint (3) of Problem P1. We refer to the resulting optimal contract design
as the “super-optimal”. For ease of analysis, we first consider the optimistic setting similar to Section
4, where a customer always chooses its dedicated option if it faces more than one contract yielding the
same benefit. The ratio between the gain of the approximate contract under the optimistic setting and
that of the super-optimal contract is difficult to analyze theoretically because the approximate contract
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and the super-optimal contract do not have closed-form solutions. Thus, we use extensive simulations
to examine the ratio. To do this, we first consider a typical example of n = 3 types of customers,
and generate parameters mi, h(mi), p0, cˆ, c0, µ, σ randomly. In particular, we vary m1 ∈ [1, 10], m2 ∈
(m1, 10m1], m3 ∈ (m2, 10m2], p0 ∈ [1, 100], k ∈ (p0, 10p0], cˆ = [0, 12p0], c0 ∈ [0, p0], µ ∈ [0, 1], σ ∈
(0, 10], and we run 10000 trials. We find that the average ratio is 0.9922, and the median ratio is
0.9975, which indicates that the approximate contract achieves a reasonable performance under the
optimistic setting. We also examine the cases of n > 3, and find the gain ratio similar (not becoming
worse as n increases).
Note that the above results assume an optimistic setting on the IC (Incentive Compatibility)
condition. That is, when the costs of more than one contract option (including baseline pricing option)
are equal, the customer will pick the dedicated option designed by the supplier, which is usually most
favorable to the supplier. Although this optimistic scenario is widely assumed in the mechanism design
literature, it may fail in practice. Similar to Section 5, we will relax this strict IC condition and quantify
the pessimistic or worst-case performance when a customer (facing more than one contract yielding
the same benefit) always picks the option that is the least favorable to the supplier.
Now we will present our approach to quantify the worst-case performance similar to Section 5. We
start from the contract Φ′ as described in Proposition 7.1, but reduce all the contract prices from
baseline price p0 by  > 0. This is to ensure that, for customers with small ∆, choosing contracts are
strictly better off than choosing the baseline scheme.
Corollary 7.2. In the pessimistic scenario, we define contract Φ′′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I} as follows.
Φ′′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I|pi = p0 − , δi = arg minδ∈[0,1](1 + δ − 2mnmi )
erf( δ−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
erf( 1−µ√
2σ
)−erf( −µ√
2σ
)
, p¯i > k, i ∈ I}.
Now we evaluate the performance of the approximate contract under the pessimistic setting. To do
this, we compare the gain under the approximate contract to the gain under the super-optimal contract,
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which is the upper bound of the optimal contract as described above. We use extensive simulations to
examine the ratio. To do this, we consider a typical example of n = 2 types of customers, and generate
parameters mi, h(mi), p0, cˆ, c0, µ, σ randomly. In particular, we vary m1 ∈ [1, 10], m2 ∈ [1.1m1, 10m1],
p0 ∈ [1, 100], k ∈ (p0, 10p0], cˆ = [0.001p0, 12p0], c0 ∈ [0, p0], µ ∈ [0, 1], σ ∈ (0, 10],  = 0.001p0, and we
run 10000 trials. We find that the average ratio is 0.974, and the median ratio is 0.989, which indicates
that the approximate contract achieves a reasonable performance under the pessimistic setting as well.
7.2 Truncated Normal Distribution for Each Customer’s Demand
Next we show that our results also apply to other distribution for each customer’s demand. Consider
the case when each customer’s demand follows a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2,
respectively. This is a truncated normal distribution version, as a type-mi customer’s demand is
bounded in [mi(1−∆),mi(1 + ∆)] in practice. We assume µ = mi for ease of exposition.
Similar to the analysis in Section 3, we first analyze the expected cost E[Ci(mi,∆)] of a type-mi
customer with maximum possible variation ∆ if it chooses option i. If ∆ < δi, the customer’s demand
is always within the contract range and its expected cost is E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mipi. If ∆ > δi, its
expected cost depends on the relationship between k and p¯i. If p¯i > k, we have
E[Ci(mi,∆)] = (2mipi − kmiδi)
erf(mi∆√
2σ
)− erf(miδi√
2σ
)
2erf(mi∆√
2σ
)
+
kσ√
2pierf(mi∆√
2σ
)
(e−
miδ
2
i
2σ2 − e−mi∆
2
2σ2 )
+mipi
erf(miδi√
2σ
)
erf(mi∆√
2σ
)
. (15)
Similar to the analysis in Proposition 3.1, under Incentive Compatibility (IC) condition, type-
mi customers with low variation (i.e., ∆ ≤ ∆th,i) will subscribe to contract option i, and type-mi
customers of high variation i will subscribe to the baseline scheme. The only difference is that ∆th,i
is not the same as that in (7) and (8). Still, ∆th,i ensures that E[Ci(mi,∆)] in (15) is equal to the
customer’s expected cost mip0 under the baseline pricing. Thus, ∆th,i is the unique solution to the
following equation.
mip0 = (2mipi − kmiδi)
erf(
mi∆th,i√
2σ
)− erf(miδi√
2σ
)
2erf(
mi∆th,i√
2σ
)
+
kσ√
2pierf(
mi∆th,i√
2σ
)
(e−
miδ
2
i
2σ2 − e−
mi∆
2
th,i
2σ2 )
+mipi
erf(miδi√
2σ
)
erf(
mi∆th,i√
2σ
)
. (16)
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The supplier’s expected profit PHi from type-mi customers if option i has high penalty (i.e., p¯i > k) is
PHi = Nh(mi)
((
mipi∆th,i +mip0(1−∆th,i)
)− c0mi − cˆ(mi(1 + δi)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i))), (17)
which has the same structure as (9). Note that the difference between (17) and (9) is that ∆th,i is now
given indirectly through the equation in (16) above.
Since it is still challenging to find the optimal contract, similar to the analysis in Section 4, we will
find an approximate contract in the set Rˆ defined in (12). By following the similar analysis, we prove
that the final approximate contract given in Proposition 7.3 is of the same structure as Proposition 4.1.
The reason is that the supplier’s expected profit PHi has the same structure in (9) under the uniform
distribution. Further, in the final approximate contract, mnmi has the same threshold value of
3
2 .
Proposition 7.3. In Problem P2, the supplier’s optimal contract design Φ′ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I|pi =
p0, δi = ∆th,i, i ∈ I} is of a simple form as follows, depending on the diversity of customers’ types and
is incentive compatible:
• If type mi is close to mn (i.e., mnmi ≤ 32), the optimal contract option i for this type is (p0, mnmi −
1
2 , p¯i > k);
• If type mi is not close to type-mn (i.e., mnmi > 32), the optimal contract option i is (p0, 1, p¯i > k).
To evaluate the performance of the approximate contract, we compare the gains of the approximate
contract and the super-optimal optimal contract as in Section 5. For ease of analysis, we consider the
optimistic setting where a customer always chooses its dedicated option if it faces more than one
contract yielding the same benefit similar to Section 4. The ratio between the gain of the approximate
contract under the optimistic setting and that of the super-optimal contract is difficult to analyze
theoretically. Thus, we use extensive simulations to examine the ratio. To do this, we consider a
typical example of n = 2 types of customers, and generate parameters mi, h(mi), p0, cˆ, c0, σ randomly.
In particular, we vary m1 ∈ [1, 10], m2 ∈ (m1, 10m1], p0 ∈ [1, 10], k ∈ (p0, 10p0], cˆ = [0, 12p0], c0 ∈
[0, p0], σ ∈ (0, 10], and we run 1000 trials. We find that the average ratio is 0.81, and the median ratio
is 0.87, which indicates that the approximate contract achieves a reasonable performance under the
optimistic setting. We also examine the cases of n > 2, and find the gain ratio to be similar (not
becoming worse as n increases).
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7.3 Continuous Distribution for Each Customer’s Mean Usage
Our flexible contract design can be extended to a continuous distribution for the mean usage and still
achieve a reasonable performance. To be concrete, we assume that each customer’s mean usage m is
continuous random variable by following a uniform distribution in the range [0, b]. We believe that the
insights revealed under the assumption can be generalized to other continuous distribution. We can
equally divide this range into n buckets
(
i.e., [0, bn ], [
b
n ,
2b
n ], . . . , [
(n−1)b
n , b]
)
, and approximate the setting
as having n classes of mean usage, where n can be tuned to trade off efficiency and complexity of the
flexible contract mechanism. We can accordingly design n contract options, each of which is dedicated
for one class of mean usage by the proposed approach in our paper. Figure 6 illustrates the relationship
between the n contract options and the n subranges of mean usage. To evaluate the performance of
the approximate contract, we consider a case of “perfect information” as an upper bound benchmark.
In the case, the supplier charges the customers with the baseline price, and is assumed to know each
customer’s full information of its mean usage and variation. We compare the gain of the approximate
contract to the gain under the case of perfect information. Figure 7 shows how the ratio between the
gain of the approximate contract and the gain under the case of perfect information changes with the
number of contract options. We see that the ratio increases concavely with the number of contract
options, and it quickly reaches over 70% as the number of options grows to 10. Finally, it converges to
around 80% as the number of options reaches 30. The reason behind the result is that as the number
of contract options increases, the supplier can learn the mean usage information of each customer at
better granularity, and thus predict the future capacity more accurately. We provide the details in the
following.
For ease of analysis, we consider an optimistic scenario similar to Section 4. That is, when the
costs of more than one contract option (including baseline pricing option) are equal, the customer will
pick the dedicated option designed by the supplier, which is usually most favorable to the supplier. We
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Figure 7: The ratio between the gain under the flexible contract and that under the case of perfect
information versus the number of contract options.
equally divide the mean usage range [0, b] into n subranges: [0, bn ], [
b
n ,
2b
n ], . . . , [
(n−1)b
n , b] . We design
n contract options for the customers, where each option is dedicated for a subrange of mean usage.
Specifically, a contract option i is dedicated for the subrange i with [ (i−1)bn ,
ib
n ]. Thus, we assume that
the midpoint of the discounted range of each option i is the midpoint mi of the subrange i, where
mi =
(2i− 1)b
2n
. (18)
We refer to a customer as type-mi customer if its mean demand is in the subrange i. (Note that the
definition is different from that under discrete distribution of the mean usage.) Intuitively, a type-mi
customer with a small variation ∆ is very likely to choose its dedicated option i. The question is
how to design the contract parameters pi, δi, p¯i. To do this, we determine an approximate contract
in Definition 7.4 below using the results in Proposition 4.1. Note that in Definition 7.4, the term mi
represents the midpoint of the subrange i and is defined in (18). This is somewhat different from
Proposition 4.1 which is based on a discrete distribution of mean usage, and which uses mi to denote
the particular mean usage of a type-mi customer. Under the continuous distribution, each option i
corresponds to an infinite number of mean usages in the subrange i. To apply the Proposition 4.1
to the contract design for the continuous distribution, we simply use the midpoint of the mean usage
subrange i to approximately represent the mean usage of all type-mi customers.
Definition 7.4. We define contract Φˆ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I} below, which depends on the diversity of
customers’ types:
• If mi is close to mn (i.e., mnmi ≤ 32), contract option i is (p0, mnmi − 12 , p¯i > k).
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• If mi is much smaller than mn (i.e., mnmi > 32), contract option i is (p0, 1, p¯i > k).
Now we evaluate the performance of the approximate contract for the uniform distribution of mean
usage. To do this, we compare the gain under the approximate contract to the gain under the case
of perfect information. To achieve this, we need to compute the supplier’s (expected) profit under
the baseline pricing, the approximate contract, and the case of perfect information. The derivation of
these terms is similar with Section III. We first analyze the profit of a customer with mean usage m,
and variation ∆. To derive the expected profit, we average the profit over all possible ∆ ∈ [0, 1], and
all possible m ∈ [0, b] sequentially. We omit the details of the derivation and only report the results.
The supplier’s (expected) profit under the baseline pricing is
P0 =
1
2
(p0 − c0)b− 2cˆb. (19)
Under the approximate contract, a type-mi customer with small variation ∆ chooses the option i, and
a type-mi customer with large variation ∆ chooses the baseline pricing. The supplier’s (expected)
profit under the approximate contract is
P (Φˆ) =
1
2
(p0 − c0)b− 2cˆb+ cˆ
b
[
b 4n+16 c∑
i=1
2mi(2b− 2mi) ln 2i
2i− 1 −
n∑
i=b 4n+16 c+1
(
(
3
2
mi −mn)(2b− 1
2
mi −mn) ln 2i− 1
2i− 2
+(
1
2
mi +mn)(
1
2
mi +mn − 2b) ln 2i
2i− 1
)
], n ≥ 2.
The supplier’s profit under the case of perfect information is
P ∗ =
1
2
(p0 − c0)b− 3
4
cˆb. (20)
Replacing mi =
(2i−1)b
2n , we can derive the ratio between the gain of the approximate contract and the
gain under the case of perfect information as follows.
Proposition 7.5. The ratio of between the gain of approximate contract and the gain under the case
of perfect information only depends on n as follows.
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• If n ≥ 2, then the gain ratio is
P (Φˆ)− P0
P ∗ − P0 =
4
5
[
b 4n+16 c∑
i=1
(2i− 1)(2n− 2i+ 1)
n2
ln
2i
2i− 1 −
n∑
i=b 4n+16 c+1
(
(6i− 4n− 1)(4n− 2i− 1)
16n2
ln
2i− 1
2i− 2 +
(2i+ 4n− 3)(2i− 4n− 3)
16n2
ln
2i
2i− 1
)
];
• If n = 1, then the gain ratio is P (Φˆ)−P0P∗−P0 = 45 (− 516 ln 2 + 1516 ln 32 ).
As described earlier, Figure 7 shows how the ratio between the gains changes with the number of
contract options n. We see that the ratio increases concavely with the number of contract options,
and it quickly reaches over 70% as the number of options grows to 10. The reason behind the result is
that, as the number of contract options increases, the supplier can learn the mean usage information
of each customer at better granularity, and thus predict the future capacity more accurately.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies how to incentivize the customers to reveal their private demand information to
the supplier. We propose a novel scheme of flexible contracts to motivate different types of customers
to truthfully reveal and even control their demand variation with commitment. We address two key
challenges in designing the optimal contract: i) the contract optimization problem is non-convex and
intractable for a large number of various customer types, and ii) the design should be robust against
customers’ uncertain responses. We propose provably effective solutions to address these challenges.
For future work, we would like to investigate how the supplier should design the optimal contract
in multiple time periods.
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Appendix
We first define ∆i,j as the maximum variability degree ∆ of type-mi customer whose whole usage is
included within the contract range of option j. We have
∆i,j =

mj(1+δj)
mi
− 1, j < i
1− mj(1−δj)mi , j > i
(21)
Note that the notation will be also used in the proof of Lemma 5.3, Claim 8.7, Lemma 5.4.
Lemma 8.1. E[Cj(mi,∆)] depends on the relationship between type-mi customer’s demand range
(i.e., [mi(1−∆),mi(1 + ∆)]) and the contract range (i.e., [mj(1− δj),mj(1 + δj)]) of option j.
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• Case a: If mi(1 + ∆) < mj(1− δj), then
E[Cj(mi,∆)] = mj(1− δj)pj .
• Case b: If mi(1−∆) > mj(1− δj) and mi(1 + ∆) ≤ mj(1 + δj), then
E[Cj(mi,∆)] = mipj .
• Case c: If mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1− δj) and mj(1− δj) ≤ mi(1 + ∆) ≤ mj(1 + δj), then
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
pj
4mi
(
m2i∆ +
(mi −mj(1− δj))2
∆
+ 2m2i + 2mimj(1− δj)
)
.
• Case d: If mj(1− δj) ≤ mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1 + δj) and mi(1 + ∆) ≥ mj(1 + δj), then E[Cj(mi,∆)]
if p¯j > k is
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
1
4mi
(
(k−pj)m2i∆+
(k − pj)(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2
∆
+2km2i+2pjm
2
i+2(pj−k)mimj(1+δj)
)
;
Otherwise, if p¯j ≤ k
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
1
4mi
(
(p¯j−pj)m2i∆+
(p¯j − pj)(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2
∆
+2p¯jm
2
i+2pjm
2
i+2(pj−p¯j)mimj(1+δj)
)
.
• Case e: If mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1− δj) and mi(1 + ∆) ≥ mj(1 + δj), then if p¯j > k,
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
1
4mi
(
km2i∆ +
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
∆
+2km2i + 2(−k(1 + δj) + 2pj)mimj
)
;
Otherwise, if p¯j ≤ k,
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
1
4mi
(
p¯jm
2
i∆ +
(−4δjpj + p¯j(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(p¯j(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + p¯jm2i
∆
+2p¯jm
2
i + 2(−p¯j(1 + δj) + 2pj)mimj
)
.
• Case f: If mi(1−∆) > mj(1 + δj), then if p¯j > k
E[Cj(mi,∆)] = (pj − k)mj(1 + δj) + kmi;
Otherwise, if p¯j ≤ k,
E[Cj(mi,∆)] = (pj − p¯j)mj(1 + δj) + p¯jmi.
Proof. There are a total of six possible cases for the relationship between type-mi customer’s usage
range and contract range of option j as shown in Figure 8. Thus, there are six cases for the cost
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E[Cj(mi,∆)] as shown in the proposition. We discuss the cost case by case. In the first case (a) that
mi(1 + ∆) < mj(1− δj) (i.e., ∆ < mj(1−δj)mi − 1). We have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mi(1+∆)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
pjmj(1− δj)dx = mj(1− δj)pj .
In the second case (b) that mi(1−∆) < mj(1−δj) and mi(1+∆) ≤ mj(1+δj) (i.e., ∆ ≤ 1−mj(1−δj)mi
and ∆ ≤ mj(1+δj)mi − 1). We have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mi(1+∆)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
pjxdx = mipj .
In the third case (c) that mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1− δj) and mj(1− δj) ≤ mi(1 + ∆) ≤ mj(1 + δj) (i.e.,
∆ ≥ 1− mj(1−δj)mi , ∆ ≥
mj(1−δj)
mi
− 1, and ∆ ≤ mj(1+δj)mi − 1). We have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mj(1−δj)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
pjmj(1− δj)dx+
∫ mi(1+∆)
mj(1−δj)
1
2mi∆
pjxdx
=
pj
2mi∆
(
mj(1− δj)(mj(1− δj)−mi(1−∆)) + 1
2
(m2i (1 + ∆)
2 −m2j (1− δj)2)
)
=
pj
4mi
(
m2i∆ +
(mi −mj(1− δj))2
∆
+ 2m2i + 2mimj(1− δj)
)
.
In the fourth case (d) that mj(1− δj) ≤ mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1 + δj) and mi(1 + ∆) ≥ mj(1 + δj) (i.e.,
∆ ≤ 1− mj(1−δj)mi , ∆ ≥ 1−
mj(1+δj)
mi
and ∆ ≥ mj(1+δj)mi − 1). If p¯j > k, we have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mj(1+δj)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
pjxdx+
∫ mi(1+∆)
mj(1+δj)
1
2mi∆
(
pjmj(1 + δj) + k(x−mj(1 + δj))
)
dx
=
1
2mi∆
(1
2
pj(m
2
j (1 + δj)
2 −m2i (1−∆)2) + (pj − k)mj(1 + δj)(mi(1 + ∆)−mj(1 + δj))
+
1
2
k(m2i (1 + ∆)
2 −m2j (1 + δi)2)
)
=
1
4mi
(
(k − pj)m2i∆ +
(k − pj)(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2
∆
+ 2km2i + 2pjm
2
i + 2(pj − k)mimj(1 + δj)
)
.
Similarly, if p¯j ≤ k, We can compute E[Cj(mi,∆)] = 14mi
(
(p¯j − pj)m2i∆ + (p¯j−pj)(mj(1+δj)−mi)
2
∆ +
2p¯jm
2
i + 2pjm
2
i + 2(pj − p¯j)mimj(1 + δj)
)
by replacing k with p¯j .
In the fifth case (e) that mi(1−∆) ≤ mj(1−δj) and mi(1+∆) ≥ mj(1+δj) (i.e., ∆ ≥ 1−mj(1−δj)mi ,
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and ∆ ≥ mj(1+δj)mi − 1). If p¯j > k, we have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mj(1−δj)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
pjmj(1− δj)dx+
∫ mj(1+δj)
mj(1−δj)
1
2mi∆
pjxdx
+
∫ mi(1+∆)
mj(1+δj)
1
2mi∆
(
pjmj(1 + δj) + k(x−mj(1 + δj))
)
dx
=
1
2mi∆
(1
2
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − (k(1 + ∆)(1 + δj)− 2(δj + ∆)pj)mimj
+
1
2
km2i (1 + ∆)
2
)
=
1
4mi
(
km2i∆ +
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
∆
+2km2i + 2(−k(1 + δj) + 2pj)mimj
)
.
Similarly, if p¯j ≤ k, We can compute E[Cj(mi,∆)] = 14mi
(
p¯jm
2
i∆+
(−4δjpj+p¯j(1+δj)2)m2j−2(p¯j(1+δj)−2δjpj)mimj+p¯jm2i
∆ +
2p¯jm
2
i + 2(−p¯j(1 + δj) + 2pj)mimj
)
by replacing k with p¯j .
In the sixth case (f) that mi(1−∆) > mj(1 + δj) (i.e., ∆ < 1− mj(1+δj)mi ). If p¯j > k, we have
E[Cj(mi,∆)] =
∫ mi(1+∆)
mi(1−∆)
1
2mi∆
(
pjmj(1 + δj) + k(x−mj(1 + δj))
)
dx
= (pj − k)mj(1 + δj) + kmi.
Similarly, if p¯j ≤ k, we can compute E[Cj(mi,∆)] = (pj − p¯j)mj(1 + δj) + p¯jmi by replacing k with
p¯j .
Hence, the lemma holds.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. We first consider the equilibrium behavior of a customer with variability degree ∆ ∈ [0, δi]. Its
expected cost is mipi if it chooses the contract option while its expected cost is mip0 if it chooses the
baseline pricing scheme. Since pi < p0, the customer’s expected cost under the contract scheme is
always smaller than that under the baseline pricing scheme. Thus, the customer will subscribe to the
contract.
We then consider a customer’s equilibrium behavior with ∆ > δi. In the high penalty regime
(p¯i > k), its expected cost is mipi +
mik
4∆ (∆ − δi)2 if it chooses the contract option and its cost is
mip0 if it chooses the baseline pricing scheme. Thus, to compute ∆th,i which separates customers in
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choosing between the two pricing schemes, we let
mipi +
mik
4∆th,i
(∆th,i − δi)2 = mip0. (22)
Since pi ≤ p0, the equation has two real value solutions:
kδi + 2(p0 − pi)−
√
(kδ + 2(p0 − pi))2 − k2δ2i
k
≤ δi,
kδi + 2(p0 − pi) +
√
(kδ + 2(p0 − pi))2 − k2δ2i
k
≥ δi. (23)
Note that customers with ∆ ∈ [0, δi] will subscribe to the contract, which indicates ∆th,i > δi. Thus,
the first solution is not a feasible threshold. Furthermore, since each customer’s variation must not
exceed 1, we have
∆th,i = min(1,
kδi + 2(p0 − pi) +
√
(kδ + 2(p0 − pi))2 − k2δ2i
k
). (24)
We then prove customers with ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] will subscribe to the contract, and customers with
∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1] choose the baseline pricing scheme. To do this, let q(∆) = mipi + mik4∆ (∆ − δi)2, and
it suffices to prove q(∆) ≤ mip0 if ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] and q(∆) > mip0 if ∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1]. To do this,
there are two cases depending on ∆th,i. In the first case that
kδi+2(p0−pi)+
√
(kδi+2(p0−pi))2−k2δ2i
k ≤ 1,
then ∆th,i =
kδi+2(p0−pi)+
√
(kδi+2(p0−pi))2−k2δ2i
k ∈ [δi, 1]. Thus, we have q(∆ = ∆th,i) = mipi +
mik
4∆th,i
(∆th,i − δi)2 = mip0, ∆th,i ∈ [δi, 1]. Since
∂q(∆)
∂∆
=
mik
4
(1− δ
2
i
∆2
) ≥ 0,∆ ≥ δi, (25)
we have q(∆) is increasing in ∆,∆ ≥ δi, and thus q(∆) ≤ mip0 if ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] and q(∆) > mip0
if ∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1]. In the second case that kδi+2(p0−pi)+
√
(kδi+2(p0−pi))2−k2δ2i
k > 1, then ∆th,i = 1, and
q(∆ = ∆th,i) = mipi +
mik
4∆th,i
(∆th,i − δi)2 ≤ mip0. Since q(∆) is increasing in ∆,∆ ≥ δi, we have
q(∆) ≤ mip0 if ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i]. Note that ∆ should not exceed 1, and thus there is no need to prove
q(∆) > mip0 if ∆ ∈ (∆th,i, 1].
Proof of Proposition 4.1
Proof. By the definition of Problem P2, its domain is Rˆ = {(pi, δi, p¯i), i ∈ I|pi = p0, δi ∈ [0, 1], p¯i >
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k, i ∈ I} and its objective is the same as Problem P1. For any solution in Rˆ, we have ∀i ∈ I, pi =
p0,∆th,i = δi. Besides, the objective of Problem P1 is shown in Equation (11). Thus, for any solution
of Problem P2, the supplier’s profit is simplified to
P (Φ) =
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)(mip0 − cˆ(mi(1 + δi)δi + 2mn(1− δi))− c0mi). (26)
Let Pi(Φi) = Nh(mi)(mip0− cˆ(mi(1 + δi)δi+ 2mn(1− δi))− c0mi) where Φi = (pi, δi, p¯i). To solve
Problem P2, it is equivalent to solve n subproblems. In particular, each subproblem i(i = 1, . . . , n) is
max
Φi
Pi(Φi). (27)
subject to
0 ≤ ∆th,i = δi ≤ 1.
We will solve each subproblem i, respectively. We have
Pi(Φi) = Nh
(
mi)(mip0 − cˆ(miδ2i + (mi − 2mn)δi + 2mn)− c0mi
)
.
which is one variable function in δi ∈ [0, 1]. The critical point of Pi(Φi) occurs at δ1 = mnmi − 12 > 0
since mn > mi. There are two situations on the critical point. One situation is that the critical point
occurs outside the domain of δi ∈ [0, 1]. In this situation, we have mnmi − 12 > 1 ((i.e., mnmi > 32 )),
and we have Pi(Φi) obtains the maximum value Nh(mi)(mip0 − 2micˆ − c0mi) at δi = 1. The other
situation is that the critical point occurs within the domain of δi ∈ [0, 1]. In this situation, we have
mn
mi
− 12 < 1 (i.e., mnmi ≤ 32 ), and the maximum Pi(Φi) is Nh(mi)(mip0 − cˆ(2mn −
(2mn−mi)2
4mi
)− c0mi)
at δi =
mn
mi
− 12 . Thus, the second statement of the proposition follows.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. To prove the proposition, it suffices to prove the gain ratio between solution Φ′ and the super-
optimal solution Φˆ in Lemma 5.2 is no smaller than 12 , since the optimal profit is no larger than than
super-optimal profit. Let Ci be the capacity for a type-mi customer prepared by the supplier. At Φ
′,
we have Ci = mi(1 + δi)δi + 2mn(1 − δi). As shown in Lemma 8.5, the gain ratio between solution
Φ′ and the super-optimal solution is no smaller than min
i∈I
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
). . To do this, it suffices to prove
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∀i ∈ I, 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
≥ 12 . Since at Φ′, δi has two cases depending on the difference between mi and mn
by Proposition 4.1, Ci also has two cases depending on the difference between mi and mn.
If mnmi ≤ 32 , we have δi = mnmi − 12 by Proposition 4.1, and therefore Ci = mi(1+δi)δi+2mn(1−δi) =
2mn − (2mn−mi)
2
4mi
. Thus, we have
2mn − Ci
2mn − 32mi
=
(2mn−mi)2
4mi
2mn − 32mi
=
m2n
m2i
− mnmi + 14
2mn
mi
− 32
≥ 1
2
.
The last inequality follows since mnmi ∈ [1, 32 ] and the term
m2n
m2
i
−mnmi +
1
4
2mn
mi
− 32
is increasing in mnmi ∈ [1, 32 ].
If mnmi >
3
2 , we have δi = 1 by Proposition 4.1, and therefore Ci = mi(1+δi)δi+2mn(1−δi) = 2mi.
Thus, we have
2mn − Ci
2mn − 32mi
=
2mn − 2mi
2mn − 32mi
=
2mn
mi
− 2
2mn
mi
− 32
≥ 2
3
.
The last inequality follows since mnmi ∈ [ 32 ,+∞] and the term
2mn
mi
−2
2mn
mi
− 32
is increasing in mnmi ∈ [ 32 ,+∞].
Thus, the proposition holds.
Proof of Lemma 5.2
To prove Lemma 5.2, we will first prove Claim 8.2.
Claim 8.2. At super-optimality, the supplier will always choose a high penalty p¯i for each option
contract i ∈ I such that the customers will actively employ their elasticity.
Proof. By removing constraint (3) of Problem P1, the supplier’s profit from all type-mi customers,
which is denoted by Pi is determined only by contract option i. Thus, to prove the claim, we will show
that at the optimality of Pi, each contract option i should be in high penalty regime (e.g., p¯i > k). In
other words, the maximum expected profit SLi in the low penalty regime is always not larger than the
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maximum expected profit SHi in the high penalty regime. To do this, we will first compute Pi under
high penalty regime and low penalty regime, respectively.
Under high penalty regime, we have
Pi = Nh(mi)
((
mipi∆th,i +mip0(1−∆th,i)
)
− c0mi − cˆ
(
mi(1 + δi)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i)
))
. (28)
Thus, the optimization problem for Pi in high penalty regime is
max
0≤δi≤1,pi≤p0,p¯i≥k,0≤∆th,i≤1
Pi. (29)
subject to constraint
∆th,i = min(1,
kδi + 2(p0 − pi) +
√
(kδi + 2(p0 − pi))2 − k2δ2i
k
).
Under low penalty regime, a type-mi customer with medium variability degree ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i]
contributes mipi +
mip¯i
4∆ (∆− δi)2 amount of revenue, which is different from the mipi term in the high
penalty regime. Moreover, note that the upper bound of electricity bought by a customer choosing the
contract is mi(1 + ∆th,i) instead of mi(1 + δi), since customers do not need to exercise their elasticity.
Furthermore, we can derive the energy consumption cost of each type mi customer by the realized
demand distribution of each customer with variability ∆ and the distribution of ∆ is
Ce(mi) = mic0
(
δi + 1−∆th,i + 1
8
(∆2th,i − δ2i ) +
δ2i
4
ln
∆th,i
δi
+(1− 1
2
δi)(∆th,i − δi)
)
, (30)
which is different from the energy generation cost term mic0 in the high penalty regime since in the low
penalty regime no customers will leverage their elasticity to shift their demand exceeding the upper
bound demand of the contract. Thus, we have
Pi=Nh(mi)
((∫ δi
0
f(∆)mipid∆ +
∫ ∆th,i
δi
f(∆)
(
mipi +
mip¯i
4∆
(∆− δi)2
)
d∆
)
+
∫ 1
∆th,i
mip0d∆
−cˆ(mi(1 + ∆th,i) + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− Ce(mi)). (31)
Thus, the optimization problem for Pi in low penalty regime is
max
0≤δi≤1,pi≤p0,p¯i≤k,0≤∆th,i≤1
Pi, (32)
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subject to constraint
∆th,i = min(1,
p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi) +
√
(p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi))2 − p¯2i δ2i
p¯i
).
from table 1.
We first replace the Ce(mi) term in Problem (32) by c0mi and construct another optimization
problem. The optimization goal of the new problem is
Pi=Nh(mi)
((∫ δi
0
f(∆)mipid∆ +
∫ ∆th,i
δi
f(∆)
(
mipi +
mip¯i
4∆
(∆− δi)2
)
d∆
)
+
∫ 1
∆th,i
mip0d∆
−cˆ(mi(1 + ∆th,i) + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− c0mi). (33)
while the constraints of the new problem remain the same. Specifically, the new optimization problem
is
max
0≤δi≤1,pi≤p0,p¯i≤k,0≤∆th,i≤1
Pi, (34)
subject to constraint
∆th,i = min(1,
p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi) +
√
(p¯iδi + 2(p0 − pi))2 − p¯2i δ2i
p¯i
).
We can show Ce(mi) ≥ c0mi. Since
∂Ce(mi)
∂∆th,i
= c0mi(
∆th,i
4
+
δ2i
4∆th,i
− δi
2
) ≥ 0, (35)
Ce(mi) is increasing in ∆th,i. Note that ∆th,i ≥ δi. Thus, Ce(mi,∆th,i) ≥ Ce(mi, δi) ≥ c0mi. Thus,
SLi is not larger than the maximum value Sˆ
L
i under the new problem (34). Thus, to prove the optimal
Pi always occur in high penalty regime, it suffices to prove Sˆ
L
i ≤ SHi .
To prove SˆLi ≤ SHi , we can show the optimal solution of the new problem is pi = p0,∆th,i =
δi = min(1,
mn
mi
− 12 ) = δ, p¯i ≤ k, SˆLi = N
(
mip0 − (miδ2 + (mi − 2mn)δ + 2mn) − c0mi
)
. In the high
penalty regime, the supplier’s expected profit at pi = p0,∆th,i = δi = min(1,
mn
mi
− 12 ) = δ, p¯i ≥ k
is SˆHi = N
(
mip0 − (miδ2 + (mi − 2mn)δ + 2mn) − c0mi
)
, which is equal to SˆLi . Thus, since pi =
p0,∆th,i = δi = min(1,
mn
mi
− 12 ) = δ, p¯i > k is a special case in the high penalty regime, we have
SHi ≥ SˆHi ≥ SˆLi . Thus, the optimal solution of Pi always occur in high penalty regime. Thus, the
claim holds.
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Now, we will prove Lemma 5.2.
Proof. As shown in the above Claim 8.2, to find the supplier’s profit, it suffices to consider high penalty
regime of contract option i. By only removing constraint (3) of Problem P1, we have each type-mi
customer either chooses the contract option idesigned for it or chooses the baseline pricing scheme.
Thus, the supplier’s profit from all type-mi customers, which is denoted by Pi is determined only by
contract option i. Thus, to optimize the supplier’s profit from all customers, it suffices to optimize Pi
in high penalty regime.
We have the supplier’s expected profit from all type-mi customers in high penalty regime is
Pi = Nh(mi)
(
mi(pi∆th,i + p0(1−∆th,i))− cˆ(mi(1 + δi)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− c0mi
)
= N(h(mi)
(
m1(p0 − k
4
(∆th,i − δi)2)− cˆ(mi(1 + δi)∆th,i + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− c0mi
)
.
The second equality follows by Table 1. The problem to optimize the supplier’s expected profit from
all type-mi customers in high penalty regime becomes
max
0≤δi≤∆th,i≤1
Pi. (36)
To solve the problem, we first fix ∆th,i at a certain value within [0, 1], and optimize δi, (δi ∈
[0,∆th,i]) under a fixed ∆th,i. We have Pi under a fixed ∆th,i is
Pi(δi) = Nh(mi)
(−k
4
miδ
2
i +mi(
k
2
−cˆ)δi∆th,i−1
4
mik∆
2
th,i−cˆ(2mn−2mn∆th,i+mi∆th,i)+mip0−mic0
)
.
where δi ∈ [0,∆th,i].
Since p0 ≥ 2cˆ by the assumption in Section 3 and k ≥ p0, we have k ≥ 2cˆ. Thus, the critical
point of Pi(δi), δi ∈ [0,∆th,i] (i.e., δi = (1 − 2cˆk )∆th,i) is within [0,∆th,i] and thus Pi(δi) obtains the
maximum value
P ∗i (δi) = Nh(mi)
(micˆ
k
(cˆ− k)∆2th,i − cˆ(mi − 2mn)∆th,i +mip0 − 2mncˆ−mic0
)
.
at δi = (1− 2cˆk )∆th,i.
We then optimize δth,i. The critical point of w
∗
i (δi), ∆th,i ∈ [0, 1] occurs at ∆th,i = k2(k−cˆ) ( 2mnmi −1).
Note that the domain of ∆th,i is [0, 1]. Thus, there are two cases. In the first case that
k
2(k−cˆ) (
2mn
mi
−1) >
1 (i.e., mnmi >
k−cˆ
k +
1
2 ), then w
∗
i (δi) is increasing in ∆th,i ∈ [0, 1] and thus the maximum value of all
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P ∗i (δi) for ∆th,i ∈ [0, 1] is
Nh(mi)
(
mip0 −mic0 − 2micˆ+ micˆ
2
k
)
, (37)
where ∆th,i = 1, and δi = 1− 2cˆk , and pi = p0 − cˆ
2
k by Table 1.
In the second case that k2(k−cˆ) (
2mn
mi
− 1) ≤ 1 (i.e., mnmi ≤ k−cˆk + 12 ), then the extremum of w∗i (δi) is
within the domain of ∆th,i ∈ [0, 1] and thus the maximum value of all w∗i (δi) for ∆th,i ∈ [0, 1] is
Nh(mi)
(
mip0 −mic0 − 2mncˆ+ cˆk(2mn −mi)
2
4mi(k − cˆ)
)
, (38)
where ∆th,i =
k
2(k−cˆ) (
2mn
mi
− 1), δi = k−2cˆ2(k−cˆ) ( 2mnmi − 1), and pi = p0 − cˆ
2
2(k−cˆ) (
2mn
mi
− 1) by Table 1.
Note that in either of the two cases, the maximum Pi is decreasing in k. Thus, the lemma holds.
Proof of Lemma 5.3
To prove the lemma, let Ci be the capacity requirement of a type-mi of customer under the
pessimistic setting at solution Φ′, if the supplier sets contract defined by Φ′. For example, suppose
that there are two types customers with m1 = 1,m2 = 1.2 and two contract options designed for
them with δ1 = 0.7, δ2 = 0.5, p1 = p2 = 10, p¯1, p¯2 > k. For type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [0, 0.4],
choosing contract option 1 incurs the same cost as option 2. Since choosing option 2 results into
lower profit to the supplier, we assume that under the pessimistic setting it chooses option 2. For
type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [0.4,∆th,1], it chooses its dedicated option 1. Thus, we can calculate
C1 = m2(1 + δ2) · 0.4 + m1(1 + δ1)(∆th,1 − 0.4) + 2m2(1 − ∆th,1). We will first prove Claim 8.3
and Claim 8.4, Lemma 8.5, Claim 8.6 that will be used to prove Lemma 5.3. Claim 8.3 states the
monotonicity of cost function E[Cj(mi,∆)] at any contract, which is shown as follows.
Claim 8.3. For any solution at high penalty regime (i.e., ∀iI, p¯i > k), E[Cj(mi,∆)], i 6= j has the
following property.
• If mi ∈ [mj(1− δj),mj(1 + δj)], then E[Cj(mi,∆)] remains constant with regard to ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,j ]
and is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥ ∆i,j, and E[Cj(mi,∆)] ≥ mipj.
• If mi /∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)] (i.e. j > i,mi < mj(1 − δj) or j < i,mi > mj(1 + δj)), then
E[Cj(mi,∆)] is non decreasing in ∆ ∈ [0, 1] and E[Cj(mi,∆)] > mipj.
Proof. Recall that E[Cj(mi,∆)] has six cases depends on the relationship between type-mi customer’s
demand range (i.e., [mi(1 −∆),mi(1 + ∆)]) and the contract range (i.e., [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)]) of
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option j by Lemma 8.1.
In case (a), (b), (f), we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] remains constant with regard to ∆. Considering case
(c), we have function E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥ |1 − mj(1−δj)mi |. Since in case (c), we
have ∆ ≥ mj(1−δj)mi − 1 and ∆ ≥ 1 −
mj(1−δj)
mi
. Thus, E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ in case
(f).
Considering case (d), since k > pj , we have function E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥√
(k−pj)(mj(1+δj)−mi)2
(k−pj)m2i ≥ |1 −
mj(1+δj)
mi
|. Since in case (d), we have ∆ ≥ mj(1+δj)mi − 1 and ∆ ≥
1− mj(1+δj)mi . Thus, E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ in case (d).
We will prove E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ in case (e). If (−4δjpj+k(1+δj)2)m2j−2(k(1+
δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i ≤ 0, E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ in case (e). Otherwise, we have
function E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥
√
(−4δjpj+k(1+δj)2)m2j−2(k(1+δj)−2δjpj)mimj+km2i
km2i
.
There are two subcases: j > i or j < i. In the first subcase that j > i, we have
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
= k(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2 + 4δjpjmj(mi −mj)
< k(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2.
Thus, we have
√
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
km2i
<
√
k(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2
km2i
<
mj(1 + δj)
mi
− 1.
The last inequality follows since mj > mi and
mj(1+δj)
mi
− 1 > 0. Thus, we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] is
increasing in ∆ ≥ mj(1+δj)mi −1 > 0. Thus, since ∆ ≥
mj(1+δj)
mi
−1 > 0 in case (e), we have E[Cj(mi,∆)]
is strictly increasing in ∆ in case (e) if (−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i > 0
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and j > i. In the second subcase that j < i, we have
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
km2i
=
k(mj(1 + δj)−mi)2 + 4δjpjmj(mi −mj)
km2i
=
((1 + δj)mj −mi)2
m2i
+
4δjpjmj(mi −mj)
km2i
<
((1 + δj)mj −mi)2
m2i
+
4δjpjmj(mi −mj)
pjm2i
<
(mi −mj(1− δj))2
m2i
.
The first inequality follows since k > pj and mi > mj .
Thus, we have
√
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i
km2i
< |1− mj(1− δj)
mi
|.
Thus, since 1 − mj(1−δj)mi > 0, we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥ 1 −
mj(1−δj)
mi
. Since
in case (e) we have ∆ ≥ 1 − mj(1−δj)mi , then E[Cj(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ in case (e) if
(−4δjpj + k(1 + δj)2)m2j − 2(k(1 + δj)− 2δjpj)mimj + km2i > 0 and j < i.
Based on the above analysis of E[Cj(mi,∆)] for each ∆ in six possible cases, we will prove the
statement of the lemma. We first prove the first statement. If j > i,mi ∈ [mj(1−δj),mj(1+δj ]), then
case (a), (d), (f) does not occur for ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. As ∆ increases in [0, 1], case (b),(c) occurs sequentially,
or (b),(c), (e) occur sequentially. Since E[Cj(mi,∆)] is constant with regard to ∆ in case (b) and
is strictly increasing in case (c),(e), and continuous at borderline points among the cases, and the
borderline point between case (b) and (c) is at ∆ = ∆i,j , we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] is constant with regard
to ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,j ] and is strictly increasing in ∆ ∈ [∆i,j , 1]. If j < i,mi ∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)],
then case (a), (c), (f) does not occur for ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. As ∆ increases in [0, 1], case (b),(d) occur
sequentially, or case (b),(d),(e) occur sequentially. Since E[Cj(mi,∆)] is constant in case (b) and
strictly increasing in ∆ in case (d), (e), and continuous at borderline points among the cases, and
the borderline point between case (b) and (d) is at ∆ = ∆i,j , we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] is constant with
regard to ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,j ] and strictly increasing in ∆ ∈ [∆i,j , 1]. Thus, if mi ∈ [mj(1− δj),mj(1 + δj)],
then E[Cj(mi,∆)] remains constant with regard to ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,j ] and is strictly increasing in ∆ ≥ ∆i,j .
Thus, since E[Cj(mi,∆)](∆ = 0) = mipj , we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] ≥ mipj for all ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the
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first statement follows.
We now prove the second statement. If mi /∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)]. If j > i,mi /∈ [mj(1 −
δj),mj(1 + δj)], then case (b), (d), (f) does not occur for ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. As ∆ increases in [0, 1], case
(a) occur, or case (a), (c) sequentially, or case (a),(c),(e) occur sequentially. Since E[Cj(mi,∆)] is
constant with regard to ∆ in case (a), and strictly increasing with regard to ∆ in case (c),(e), and
continuous at borderline points among the cases, we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] is non-decreasing in ∆ ∈ [0, 1].
If j < i,mi /∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)], then case (a), (b), (c) does not occur for ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. As
∆ increases in [0, 1], case (f) occurs, or case (f), (d) occur sequentially, or case (f), (d),(e) occur
sequentially. Since E[Cj(mi,∆)] is constant with regard to ∆ in case (f) and is strictly increasing
in ∆ in case (d), (e), and continuous at borderline points among the cases, we have E[Cj(mi,∆)]
is non-decreasing in ∆ ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, we will prove if mi /∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)], then
E[Cj(mi,∆)] > mipj . If j > i, since mi /∈ [mj(1− δj),mj(1 + δj)]), we have mi < mj(1− δj). hus, we
have E[Cj(mi,∆)] ≥ E[Cj(mi,∆)](∆ = 0) ≥ mj(1− δj)pj > mipj . If j < i, we have mi > mj(1 + δj).
Thus, we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] ≥ E[Cj(mi,∆)](∆ = 0) ≥ (pj − k)mj(1 + δj) + kmi > mipj since pj < k.
Thus, the second statement follows.
The claim is intuitively correct. Consider type-mi customer with ∆ chooses option j. As ∆
increases, the customer has more demand surpassing the contract range of option j and therefore
needs to undertake more penalty or flexibility cost. Note that the claim will be also used in Lemma
8.8.
We then prove Claim 8.4, which is stated below.
Claim 8.4. Let z =
A−∑ni=1 xiai
A−∑ni=1 xibi , A, ai, bi, xi > 0, A−
∑n
i=1 xibi > 0,∀i ∈ [1, n], A−bi > 0,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1.
Then we have z ≥ min(A−aiA−bi ), i = 1, . . . , n.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume min(A−a1A−b1 , . . . ,
A−an
A−bn ) =
A−aj
A−bj . To prove the claim, we
will prove z − A−ajA−bj ≥ 0. We have
z − A− aj
A− bj =
w
(A−∑ni=1 bixi)(A− bj)
=
A(aj − bj) +
∑n
i=1
(
(A− aj)bi − (A− bj)ai
)
xi
(A−∑ni=1 bixi)(A− bj) .
where w = (A − ∑ni=1 aixi)(A − bj) − (A − ∑ni=1 bixi)(A − aj). To prove z − A−ajA−bj ≥ 0, since
A−∑ni=1 xibi > 0, A− bj > 0, it suffice to prove A(aj − bj) +∑ni=1 ((A− aj)bi − (A− bj)ai)xi ≥ 0.
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We have ∀i ∈ [1, n], A−biA−ai ≥
A−aj
A−bj . Thus, since A − bi > 0, A − bj > 0, we have (A − ai)(A − bj) ≥
(A− bi)(A− aj). Thus, we have A(A− bj)− ai(A− bj) ≥ A(A− aj)− bi(A− aj). Thus, we have
bi(A− aj)− aj(A− bi) ≥ A(A− aj)−A(A− bj)
≥ A(bj − aj).
Thus, we have
∑n
i=1
(
(A− aj)bi − (A− bj)ai
)
xi ≥ A(bj − aj)
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ A(bj − aj), since
∑n
i=1 = 1.
Thus, we have
A(aj − bj) +
n∑
i=1
(
(A− aj)bi − (A− bj)ai
)
xi ≥ 0. (39)
Thus, the claim holds.
Now we will prove Lemma 8.5 as follows.
Lemma 8.5. The gain ratio between solution Φ′ and the super-optimal solution is no smaller than
min
i∈I
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
).
Proof. As defined in Section 5, the gain ratio between solution Φ′ and the super-optimal solution is
P (Φ′)−P0
Pˆ∗−p0 , where P (Φ
′) is the supplier’s profit at solution Φ′, and Pˆ ∗ is the super-optimal profit, and
P0 is the supplier’s profit without contract options.
By Lemma 5.2, Pˆ ∗ is decreasing in k. Thus, since k ≥ 2cˆ, we have Pˆ ∗ ≤ P¯ ∗(k = 2cˆ). Thus, since
Pˆ ∗(k = 2cˆ) =
∑n
i=1Nh(mi)mi(p0−c0− 32 cˆ), we have Pˆ ∗ ≤
∑n
i=1Nh(mi)mi(p0−c0− 32 cˆ). Combining
this with Equation (1), we have
Pˆ ∗ − P0 ≤ 2Nmncˆ− 3
2
Nh(m1)m1cˆ− . . .− 3
2
Nh(mn)mncˆ. (40)
Besides, we have P (Φ′) =
∑n
i=1Nh(mi)(mip0 − cˆCi − c0mi). To prove this, we have each type-
mi customer contributes mip0 amount of revenue to the supplier even if it wrongly chooses other
contract options. Also, we have each customer’s mean energy consumption is mi. Since ∆th,i = δi,
we divide type-mi customers into two classes by ∆ ∈ [0, δi] and ∆ ∈ [δi, 1]. In particular, for each
type-micustomer with ∆ ≤ δi, it may choose option i or other option j. If it chooses option i, its mean
energy consumption is mi. If it chooses other option j, it must have mi ∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)]
and ∆ ≤ ∆i,j . To show this, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mip0. If mi /∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)], we
have E[Cj(mi,∆)] > mip0 by Claim 8.3 and E[Cj(mi,∆)] > E[Ci(mi,∆)], and thus the customer will
not choose option j. If mi ∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)],∆ > ∆i,j , we have E[Cj(mi,∆)] > mip0 by
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Claim 8.3, and E[Cj(mi,∆)] > E[Ci(mi,∆)], and thus it will not choose option j. Thus, we have if
type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ [0, δi] chooses other option j, it must have mi ∈ [mj(1 − δj),mj(1 + δj)]
and ∆ ≤ ∆i,j . Thus, we have type-mi customer’s whole usage range is contained in option i’s contract
range. Thus, its demand is not changed by the customer and its mean energy consumption is mi.
For each type-mi customer with ∆ > δi, it chooses baseline pricing scheme and its mean energy
consumption is also mi since its demand within [mi(1−∆),mi(1+∆)] is not changed by the customer
in order not to incur high flexibility cost.
Thus, we have
P (Φ′)− P0 = Ncˆ(2mn − h(m1)C1 − . . .− h(mn)Cn). (41)
Note that P (Φ′)− P0 > 0 since we can derive ∀i ∈ [1, n], Ci < 2mn. Thus, we have
P (Φ′)− P0
Pˆ ∗ − P0
≥ P (Φ
′)− P0
Pˆ ∗(k = 2cˆ)− P0
≥ 2mn − h(m1)C1 − . . .− h(mn)Cn
2mn − 32h(m1)m1 − 32h(m2)m2 − . . .− 32h(mn)mn
≥ min
i∈I
(
2mn − Ci
2mn − 32mi
).
The last inequality follows by Claim 8.4. Hence, the lemma holds.
Claim 8.6. Φ′ has the following property:
• m1(1 + δ1) < m2(1 + δ2) < . . . < mn(1 + δn);
• m1(1− δ1) ≤ m2(1− δ2) ≤ . . . ≤ mn(1− δn).
Proof. To prove the claim, it suffices to prove mi(1 + δi) < mi′(1 + δi′) and mi(1− δi) ≤ mi′(1− δi′)
for any two contract options i, i′, (i < i′) at Φ′.
There are two cases. In the first case that mnm1 ≤ 32 . We have δi = mnmi − 12 and δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 by
Proposition 4.1. Thus, we have mi(1 + δi)−mi′(1 + δi′) = 12 (mi −mi′) < 0 since mi < mi′ . Also, we
have mi(1− δi)−mi′(1− δi′) = 32 (mi −mi′) < 0 since mi < mi′ .
In the second case that mnm1 >
3
2 . Assume
mn
mj
> 32 and
mn
mj+1
≤ 32 , j = 1, , . . . , n − 1. If i, i′ ≤ j,
we have δi = δi′ = 1 by Proposition 4.1. Thus, we have mi(1 + δi) −mi′(1 + δi′) = 2(mi −mi′) < 0,
and mi(1− δi)−mi′(1− δi′) = 0. If i, i′ > j, we have δi = mnmi − 12 and δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 . Thus, we have
mi(1+δi)−mi′(1+δi′) = 12 (mi−mi′) < 0, and mi(1−δi)−mi′(1−δi′) = 32 (mi−mi′) < 0. If i ≤ j and
i′ > j, we have δi = 1, δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 . Thus, we have mi(1+δi)−mi′(1+δi′) = 12 (4mi−2mn−mi′) < 0.
Since mi <
2
3mn,mi′ ≥ 23mn, we have 4mi < 83mn and 2mn +mi′ ≥ 83mn, and 4mi − 2mn −mi′ < 0.
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Thus, we have mi(1+δi)−mi′(1+δi′) < 0. Also, we have mi(1−δi)−mi′(1−δi′) = −mi′( 32− mnmi′ ) ≤ 0
since mnmi′
≤ 32 .
Overall, the claim follows.
Next, we will prove Lemma 5.3.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 8.5, the gain ratio between solution Φ′ and the super-optimal solution is
no smaller than min
i∈I
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
). For ease of presentation later, let rg represent the gain ratio between
solution Φ′ and the super-optimal solution. Thus, to prove rg, it suffices to prove min
i∈I
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
) ≥ 13 .
Without loss of generality, we assume min
i=1,...,n
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
) = 2mn−C1
2mn− 32m1
. Since m1(1+δ1) < m2(1+δ2) <
. . . < mn(1 + δn) by Claim 8.6, if min
i=1,...,n
( 2mn−Ci
2mn− 32mi
) = 2mn−Ci′
2mn− 32mi′
, it can be seen that Ci′ is C1 and
there are n− i′ + 1 options.
Now we discuss all possible contract option choices of type-m1 customer and find the lower bound
of 2mn−C1
2mn− 32m1
in all cases. Generally, there are three cases. In the first case shown in Figure 9(a), we
assume mnm1 ≤ 32 . In the second case shown in figure 9(b), we assume mnm1 ≥ 2. In the third case shown
in figure 9(c), we assume 32 ≤ mnm1 ≤ 2.
To prove the lemma, we will prove rg > 0.476 if
mn
m1
≤ 32 , rg > 13 if mnm1 ≥ 2 and rg > 0.466 if
3
2 <
mn
m1
< 2.
1) In the first case, Φ′ is δi = mnmi − 12 , i = 1, . . . , n by Proposition 4.1. We have m1(1 + δ1) <
m2(1 + δ2) < . . . < mn(1 + δn) by Claim 8.6. We have ∆1,i = 1− mi(1−δi)m1 , i = 1, . . . , n. Thus, since
δi =
mn
mi
− 12 , i = 1, . . . , n, we have δ1 = ∆1,1 > ∆1,2 > . . . > ∆1,n > 0 by Claim 8.6. For a m1
type of customer with ∆ ∈ [∆1,i+1,∆1,i], i = 1, . . . , n − 1, we have E[C1(m1,∆)] = E[C2(m1,∆)] =
. . . = E[Ci(m1,∆)] = m1p0 < E[Ci′(m1,∆)], i′ > i. The supplier can choose any option among options
1, . . . , i. Since m1(1 + δ1) < m2(1 + δ2) < . . . < mi(1 + δi), we assume m1 type of customer choose
contract option i since the estimated capacity of the customer is mi(1 + δi) which is the worst for
the supplier, the revenue it contributes to the supplier is mip0 whatever option it chooses, the mean
energy consumption it results in is mi whatever option it chooses, and therfore the profit it chooses
option i is the worst. For a m1 type of customer with ∆ ∈ [0,∆1,n], we have E[C1(m1,∆)] = C1,2 =
. . . = E[Cn(m1,∆)] = m1p0 and we assume it chooses option n for the worst-case profit of the supplier.
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E[C2(m1,∆)]
m1p0
Type-m1 customer’s cost
△
∆1,1=δ1=△th,1
…
∆1,2∆1,n
E[Cn(m1,∆)]
E[C1(m1,∆)]
(a) Case 1: mn
m1
≤ 3
2
E[Cj+1(m1,∆)]
m1p0
Type-m1 customer’s cost
△
∆1,1=δ1=△th,1
…
∆1,j+1∆1,j’
E[Cj’(m1,∆)]
E[C1(m1,∆)],
…,
E[Cj(m1,∆)]
E[Cn(m1,∆)]
…
(b) Case 2: mn
m1
≥ 2
E[Cj+1(m1,∆)]
m1p0
Type-m1 customer’s cost
△
∆1,1=1=δ1=△th,1
…
∆1,j+1∆1,n
E[C1(m1,∆)],
…,
E[Cj(m1,∆)]
E[Cn(m1,∆)]
(c) Case 3: 3
2
< mn
m1
< 2
Figure 9: Type-mi customer’s cost functions with ∆ when choosing different options
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Besides, type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [δ1, 1] subscribes to the baseline pricing scheme. Thus, we have
C1 = 2mn(1− δ1) +
n−1∑
i=1
mi(1 + δi)(∆1,i −∆1,i+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆1,n
= 2mn(1− δ1) +
n−1∑
i=1
mi(1 + δi)(
mi+1(1− δi+1)
m1
− mi(1− δi)
m1
) +mn(1 + δn)(1− mn(1− δn)
m1
)
= 2mn(1− (mn
m1
− 1
2
)) +
n−1∑
i=1
3
2
mi(1 +
mn
mi
− 1
2
)
mi+1 −mi
m1
+
3
2
mn(1− mn
2m1
)
= 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
n−1∑
i=1
(
3mimi+1
4m1
− 3m
2
i
4m1
+
3mi+1mn
2m1
− 3mimn
2m1
) +
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
= 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+ (
n−1∑
i=1
3mimi+1
4m1
−
n−1∑
i=1
3m2i
4m1
+
3m2n
2m1
− 3
2
mn) +
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
= 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
( 3
4m1
n−1∑
i=1
(mimi+1 −m2i ) +
3m2n
2m1
− 3
2
mn
)
+
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
.
Thus, to find the lower bound of 2mn−C1
2mn− 32m1
, we will find the maximum value of C1, considering
m1,mn, n as fixed values. Note that m1 < m2 < . . . < mn. We have
C1 = 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
(− 3
8m1
n−1∑
i=1
(2m2i − 2mimi+1) +
3m2n
2m1
− 3
2
mn
)
+
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
= 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
(− 3
8m1
(m21 −m2n +
n−1∑
i=1
(mi+1 −mi)2) + 3m
2
n
2m1
− 3
2
mn
)
+
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
≤ 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
(− 3
8m1
(m21 −m2n +
(mn −m1)2
n− 1 ) +
3m2n
2m1
− 3
2
mn
)
+
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
≤ 3mn − 2m
2
n
m1
+
(3(5n− 6)
8(n− 1)
m2n
m1
+
3(3− 2n)
4(n− 1) mn −
3n
8(n− 1)m1
)
+
3mn
2
− 3m
2
n
4m1
≤ (9
2
+
3(3− 2n)
4(n− 1)
)
mn +
(3(5n− 6)
8(n− 1) −
11
4
)m2n
m1
− 3n
8(n− 1)m1.
To show the first inequality follows, it suffices to show
∑n−1
i=1 (mi+1 −mi)2 ≥ (mn−m1)
2
n−1 . To do this,
let xi = mi+1 −mi, i ∈ [1, n − 1]. We have x1 + x2 + . . . + xn−1 = mn −m1. Thus, it is equivalent
to prove
∑n−1
i=1 x
2
i ≥ (
∑n−1
i=1 xi)
2
n−1 . We can prove the inequality by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. We have
(n−1)∑n−1i=1 x2i = (12 +12 + . . .+12)(x21 +x22 + . . .+x2n−1) ≥ (x1 +x2 + . . .+xn−1)2 by Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality. Thus, we have
∑n−1
i=1 x
2
i ≥ (
∑n−1
i=1 xi)
2
n−1 and the first inequality follows.
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Taking the upper bound of C1 into
2mn−C1
2mn− 32m1
, we have
2mn − C1
2mn − 32m1
≥
(−4n+1)mn
4(n−1) +
3nm1
8(n−1) +
(7n−4)m2n
8(n−1)m1
2mn − 32m1
≥
(−8n+ 2)mnm1 + (7n− 4)
m2n
m21
+ 3n
8(n− 1)( 2mnm1 − 32 )
≥
− 8mnm1 +
7m2n
m21
+ 3
8( 2mnm1 − 32 )
≥ 0.476.
We first prove the third inequality follows. Let y represent the term on the right of the second
inequality. We have ∂y∂n =
−3(mnm1 −1)
2
8(n−1)( 2mnm1 −
3
2 )
< 0 since mnm1 > 1. Thus, y is decreasing in n. Thus,
since n < +∞, we have the third inequality follows. We will prove the last inequality follows. Let
z represent the term on the right of the third inequality and x = mnm1 ∈ [1, 32 ]. To prove the last
inequality follows, we will prove z = −8x+7x
2+3
8(2x− 32 )
≥ 0.476, x ∈ [1, 32 ]. We have ∂z∂x = 14x
2−21x+6
8(2x− 32 )2
. For
equation 14x2 − 21x + 6 = 0, x ∈ [1, 32 ], we have x = 21+
√
105
28 ∈ (1, 32 ). Thus, since the function
14x2 − 21x + 6, x ∈ [1, 32 ] is increasing in x ∈ [1, 32 ], we have 14x2 − 21x + 6 ≤ 0 for x ∈ [1, 21+
√
105
28 ]
and 14x2 − 21x + 6 > 0 for x ∈ [ 21+
√
105
28 ,
3
2 ]. Thus, since 8(2x − 32 )2 > 0, we have ∂z∂x ≤ 0 for
x ∈ [1, 21+
√
105
28 ] and
∂z
∂x > 0 for x ∈ [ 21+
√
105
28 ,
3
2 ]. Thus, we have z(x), x ∈ [1, 32 ] obtains the minimum
value at x = 21+
√
105
28 ∈ (1, 32 ). Thus, we have z ≥ z(x = 21+
√
105
28 ) ≥ 0.476 and the last inequality
follows.
2) In the second case, we assume mnmj >
3
2 and
mn
mj+1
≤ 32 , j = 1, . . . , n− 1. Φ′ is δi = 1, i = 1, . . . , j,
δi =
mn
mi
− 12 , i = j+1, . . . , n by Proposition 4.1. We also havem1(1+δ1) < m2(1+δ2) < . . . < mn(1+δn)
and m1(1−δ1) > m2(1−δ2) > . . . < mn(1−δn). Assume m1 ≥ mj′(1−δj′) and m1 < mj′+1(1−δj′+1),
j′ = j + 1, . . . , n− 1. We have ∆1,1 = ∆1,2 = . . . = ∆1,j = 1 > . . . > ∆1,j′ ≥ 0. Since E[Ci(m1,∆)] >
m1p0, i = j
′+1, . . . , n by Claim 8.3 and E[C1(m1,∆)] = m1p0 for ∆ ∈ [0, 1], type-m1 customer will not
choose options j′ + 1, . . . , n− 1. For a type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [∆1,i+1,∆1,i], i = j + 1, . . . , j′ − 1,
we have E[C1(m1,∆)] = E[C2(m1,∆)] = . . . = E[Ci(m1,∆)] < E[Ci′(m1,∆)], i′ > i and the customer
may choose any contract option among options 1, . . . , i. Since m1(1 + δ1) < m2(1 + δ2) < . . . <
mi(1+δi), we assume m1 type of customer choose contract option i since the estimated capacity of the
customer is mi(1 + δi) which causes the worst-case profit for the supplier. For a m1 type of customer
with ∆ ∈ [0,∆1,j′ ], we have E[C1(m1,∆)] = E[C2(m1,∆)] = . . . = E[Cj′(m1,∆)] = m1p0 and we
assume it chooses option j′ for the worst-case profit of the supplier. Besides, type-m1customer with
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∆ ∈ [∆1,j+1, 1] subscribes to option j for the worst-case profit of the supplier. Thus, we have
C1 = mj(1 + δj)(1−∆1,j+1) +
j′−1∑
i=j+1
mi(1 + δi)(∆1,i −∆1,i+1) +mj′(1 + δj′)∆1,j′
= mj(1 + δj)(1− (1− mj+1(1− δj+1)
m1
)) +
j′−1∑
i=j+1
mi(1 + δi)(
mi+1(1− δi+1)
m1
− mi(1− δi)
m1
)
+mj′(1 + δj′)(1− mj
′(1− δj′)
m1
)
=
2mjmj+1
m1
(1− ( mn
mj+1
− 1
2
)) +
j′−1∑
i=j+1
3
2
mi(1 +
mn
mi
− 1
2
)
mi+1 −mi
m1
+mj′(1 +
mn
mj′
− 1
2
)(1− mj′
m1
(1− mn
mj′
+
1
2
))
=
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+
j′−1∑
i=j+1
3
2m1
(
mimi+1
2
− m
2
i
2
+mnmi+1 −mnmi)
+(
1
2
mj′ −
3m2j′
4m1
− mnmj′
m1
+mn +
m2n
m1
).
We will find the upper bound of C1. To do this, we have
C1 =
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
j′−1∑
i=j+1
(2m2i − 2mimi+1 + 4mn(mi −mi+1))
+(
1
2
mj′ −
3m2j′
4m1
− mnmj′
m1
+mn +
m2n
m1
)
=
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
(
(m2j+1 −m2j′) +
j′−1∑
i=j+1
(mi −mi+1)2 + 4mn(mj+1 −mj′)
)
+(
1
2
mj′ −
3m2j′
4m1
− mnmj′
m1
+mn +
m2n
m1
)
≤ 3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
(
(m2j+1 −m2j′) +
(mj′ −mj+1)2
j′ − j − 1 + 4mn(mj+1 −mj′)
)
+(
1
2
mj′ −
3m2j′
4m1
− mnmj′
m1
+mn +
m2n
m1
)
≤ 3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+
3m2j′(j
′ − j − 2)
8(j′ − j − 1)m1 −
3(j′ − j)m2j+1
8(j′ − j − 1)m1 +
3mj′mj+1
4(j′ − j − 1)m1
+
3mn(mj′ −mj+1)
2m1
+ (
1
2
mj′ −
3m2j′
4m1
− mnmj′
m1
+mn +
m2n
m1
).
The first inequality follows by the inequality
∑n−1
i=1 (mi+1 −mi)2 ≥ (mn−m1)
2
n−1 , which has been proved
in the first case. Since the term on the right of the last inequality is increasing in mj and mj ≤ 23mn,
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we have
C1 ≤
m′j
2
− 3(j
′ − j)
8(j′ − j − 1)
m2j′
m1
+
mnmj′
2m1
+mn − m
2
n
3m1
− 3(j
′ − j)
8(j′ − j − 1)
m2j+1
m1
+
3
4(j′ − j − 1)
m′jmj+1
m1
+
mnmj+1
2m1
≤ mj′
2
− 3m
2
j′
8m1
+
mnmj′
2m1
+mn − m
2
n
3m1
− 3m
2
j+1
8m1
+
mnmj+1
2m1
≤ mj′
2
− 3m
2
j′
8m1
+
mnmj′
2m1
+mn − m
2
n
6m1
≤ 1
6
m1 +
4
3
mn.
The second inequality follows since j′ − j < +∞ and the term on the right of the first inequality
is increasing in j′ − j. To see this, let y represent the term on the right of the first inequality and
t = j′ − j. We have ∂y∂t =
3(mj′−mj+1)2
8m1(t−1)2 ≥ 0. The third inequality follows since mj+1 ≥ 23mn and the
term on the right of the second inequality is decreasing in mj+1. To see this, let z represent the term
on the right of the second inequality. We have ∂z∂mj+1 = − 14m1 (3mj+1 − 2mn) ≤ 0 since mj+1 ≥ 23mn.
The last inequality follows since the term on the right of the third inequality is concave as a function
of mj′ and obtains the maximum at mj′ =
2
3 (m1 +mn) ∈ ( 23mn,mn).
Thus, we have
2mn − C1
2mn − 32m1
≥
2
3mn − 16m1
2mn − 32m1
≥
2
3
mn
m1
− 16
2mnm1 − 32
≥ 1
3
.
The third inequality follows since the term on the right of the second inequality is decreasing in mnm1
and mnm1 < +∞.
3) In the third case, Φ′ is δi = 1, i = 1, . . . , j, δi = mnmi − 12 , i = j + 1, . . . , n by Proposition 4.1. We
also have m1(1+δ1) < m2(1+δ2) < . . . < mn(1+δn) and ∆1,1 = ∆1,2 = . . . = ∆1,j = 1 > . . . > ∆1,n >
0. For a m1 type of customer with ∆ ∈ [∆1,i+1,∆1,i], i = j + 1, . . . , n − 1, we have E[C1(m1,∆)] =
E[C2(m1,∆)] = . . . = E[Ci(m1,∆)] < E[Ci′(m1,∆)], i′ > i and the customer may choose any contract
option among options j + 1, . . . , i. Since m1(1 + δ1) < m2(1 + δ2) < . . . < mi(1 + δi), we assume
type-m1 customer choose contract option i since the estimated capacity of the customer is mi(1 + δi)
which causes the worst-case profit for the supplier. For a type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [0,∆1,n], we
have E[C1(m1,∆)] = E[C2(m1,∆)] = . . . = E[Cn(m1,∆)] = m1p0 and we assume it chooses option n
for the worst -case profit of the supplier. Besides, type-m1 customer with ∆ ∈ [∆1,j+1, 1] subscribes
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to option j for the worst-case profit of the supplier. Thus,
C1 = mj(1 + δj)(1−∆1,j+1) +
n−1∑
i=j+1
mi(1 + δi)(∆1,i −∆1,i+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆1,n
= mj(1 + δj)(1− (1− mj+1(1− δj+1)
m1
)) +
n−1∑
i=j+1
mi(1 + δi)(
mi+1(1− δi+1)
m1
− mi(1− δi)
m1
)
+mn(1 + δn)(1− mn(1− δn)
m1
)
=
2mjmj+1
m1
(1− ( mn
mj+1
− 1
2
)) +
n−1∑
i=j+1
3
2
mi(
1
2
+
mn
mi
)
mi+1 −mi
m1
+
3
2
mn(1− mn
2m1
)
=
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+
n−1∑
i=j+1
(
3mimi+1
4m1
− 3m
2
i
4m1
+
3mnmi+1
2m1
− 3mnmi
2m1
) +
3
2
mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
.
Thus, to compute the lower bound of 2mn−C1
2mn− 32m1
, it suffices to obtain the upper bound of C1. To do
this, we have
C1 =
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
n−1∑
i=j+1
(−2mimi+1 + 2m2i − 4mnmi+1 + 4mnmi) +
3
2
mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
=
3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
(
(m2j+1 −m2n) +
n−1∑
i=j+1
(mi −mi+1)2 +
n−1∑
i=j+1
4mn(mi −mi+1)
)
+
3
2
mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
≤ 3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
+ (− 3
8m1
)
(
(m2j+1 −m2n) +
(mn −mj+1)2
n− j − 1 + 4mn(mj+1 −mn)
)
+
3
2
mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
≤ 3
2
mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
+
3
8(n− j − 1)m1 ((5n− 5j − 6)m
2
n − (n− j)m2j+1
+(−4n+ 4j + 6)mj+1mn) + 3mjmj+1
m1
− 2mjmn
m1
.
The first inequality follows by the inequality
∑n−1
i=1 (mi+1 −mi)2 ≥ (mn−m1)
2
n−1 , which has been proved
in the first case.
To compute the upper bound of C1, we let D =
3
2mn − 3m
2
n
4m1
+ 38(n−j−1)m1 ((5n− 5j − 6)m2n − (n−
j)m2j+1 + (−4n+ 4j + 6)mj+1mn) + 3mjmj+1m1 −
2mjmn
m1
. We have ∂D∂mj =
3mj+1−2mn
m1
. Since mnmj+1 ≤ 32 ,
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we have ∂D∂mj ≥ 0. Thus, since mj ≤ 23mn and C1 ≤ D, we have
C1 ≤ 3
2
mn + (−25
12
+
3(5n− 5j − 6)
8(n− j − 1) )
m2n
m1
− 3(n− j)
8(n− j − 1)
m2j+1
m1
+
4n− 4j + 2
8(n− j − 1)
mj+1mn
m1
≤ 3
2
mn + (−25
12
+
3(5n− 5j − 6)
8(n− j − 1) +
(2n− 2j + 1)2
24(n− j − 1)(n− j) )
m2n
m1
≤ 3
2
mn − 1
24
(1 +
1
n− j )
m2n
m1
≤ 3
2
mn − m
2
n
24m1
.
The second inequality follows since the term on the right of the first inequality obtains the maximum
value at mj+1 =
2n−2j+1
3(n−j) mn ∈ ( 23mn,mn). The third inequality follows since − 2512 + 3(5n−5j−6)8(n−j−1) +
(2n−2j+1)2
24(n−j−1)(n−j) = − 124 (1 + 1n−j ). The last inequality follows since the term on the right of the second
inequality is increasing in n− j and n− j < +∞. Thus, we have
2mn − C1
2mn − 32m1
≥
mn
2 +
m2n
24m1
2mn − 32m1
≥
mn
2m1
+
m2n
24m21
2mn
m1
− 32
≥ 0.466.
To prove the last inequality, let y =
x
2 +
x2
24
2x− 32
, x = mnm1 ∈ [ 32 , 2]. We have y′(x) =
1
12x
2− 18x− 34
(2x− 32 )2
. Since
1
12x
2 − 18x− 34 , x ∈ [ 32 , 2] is increasing in x and 112x2 − 18x− 34 = − 23 < 0 at x = 2. Thus, y′(x) < 0 for
x ∈ [ 32 , 2]. Thus, y ≥ y(2) ≥ 715 ≥ 0.466 and the last inequality follows.
Overall, the lemma holds.
Proof of Lemma 5.4
To prove the lemma, we will first prove Lemma 8.8. To prove the lemma, we will first prove Claim
8.7 as follows. Recall that ∆i,j is defined as the maximum variability degree ∆ of type-mi customer
whose whole usage is included within the contract range of option j.
Claim 8.7. At solution Φ′, consider any type-mi of customer and two contract options i and i′, i′ 6= i
with mi ∈ [mi′(1− δi′),mi′(1 + δi′)]. Then we have if δi < 1, then ∆i,i′ < δi.
Proof. There are two cases. In the first case, we consider mnm1 <
3
2 . By Lemma 4.1, we have δi =
mn
mi
− 12 < 1. There are two subcases for i′. If i′ < i, then ∆i,i′ = mi′ (1+δi′ )mi − 1. Thus, since
δi′ =
mn
mi′
− 12 by Lemma 4.1, we have ∆i,i′ − δi = mi′−mi2mi < 0 since mi′ < mi. Otherwise, if i′ > i, we
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E[Ci(mi,∆)]
E[Ci’(mi,∆)]
δi △th,i
mip0
mip
Type-mi customer’s cost
△
△i,i’
δi+ε'
Figure 10: Illustration of the consequence without the property at Φ′ in Claim 8.7
have ∆i,i′ = 1− mi′ (1−δi′ )mi . Thus, since δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 by Lemma 4.1, we have ∆i,i′−δi = 3(mi−mi′ )2mi < 0
since mi < mi′ . Thus, we have ∆i,i′ < δi for any i
′ 6= i.
In the second case, we consider mnmj ≥ 32 and mnmj+1 < 32 , j = 1, . . . , n− 1. Firstly, we consider i with
i ≤ j. By Lemma 4.1, we have δi = 1. Next, we consider i with i ≥ j + 1. We have δi = mnmi − 12 < 1
by Lemma 4.1. There are three subcases for i′. In the first subcase that i′ ≤ j, we have δi′ = 1,
i′ < i and ∆i,i′ =
mi′ (1+δi′ )
mi
− 1. Thus, we have ∆i,i′ − δi = 4mi′−mi−2mn2mi . Since mi′ ≤ 23mn and
mi >
2
3mn, we have 4mi′ − mi − 2mn < 0. Thus, we have ∆i,i′ < δi. In the second subcase that
j + 1 ≤ i′ < i, we have δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 , and ∆i,i′ =
mi′ (1+δi′ )
mi
− 1. Thus, since δi = mnmi − 12 , we have
∆i,i′−δi = mi′−mi2mi < 0 since mi′ < mi. In the third subcase that i′ > i, we have ∆i,i′ = 1−
mi′ (1−δi′ )
mi
.
Thus, since δi′ =
mn
mi′
− 12 and δi = mnmi − 12 by Lemma 4.1, we have ∆i,i′ − δi =
3(mi−mi′ )
2mi
< 0 since
mi < mi′ .
Overall, we have if δi < 1, then ∆i,i′ < δi and the lemma follows.
This claim is important because it implies that at a solution Φ′′ (around Φ′), E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤
E[Ci′(mi,∆)] for all ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i]. Without the property (i.e., assume ∆i,i′ > δi), at the solution Φ′′
(around Φ′), type-mi of customer’s cost when choosing option i′ is lower than that choosing its right
option i for some ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i], which breaks the IC constraint (3). For example, Figure 10 shows
the cost function E[Ci(mi,∆)] and E[Ci′(mi,∆)] at the solution near Φ′ assuming ∆i,i′ > δi. We see
E[Ci′(mi,∆)] < E[Ci(mi,∆)] at ∆ = δi + ′ < ∆th,i. This is because E[Ci(mi,∆)] is larger than mip
at ∆ = δi + 
′ < ∆i,i′ (′ is a very small positive real number) while E[Ci′(mi,∆)] is still mip at the
point since ∆i,i′ > δi + 
′.
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By Claim 8.3 and Claim 8.7, we show there exists an ˆ > 0 such that for all 0 <  < ˆ, the solutions
near Φ′ are feasible.
Lemma 8.8. There exist an ˆ > 0 such that for all 0 <  < ˆ, the solutions Φ′′ (around Φ′) are
feasible.
Proof. To find a feasible solution Φ′′ (around Φ′), we need to make sure that E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤ E[Ci′(mi,∆)]
for any ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i] at the solution. We will prove that there exist a range [0, th,i,i′ ], th,i,i′ > 0
of  (i.e.  ∈ [0, th,i,i′ ]) such that E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤ E[Ci′(mi,∆)] under the solution near Φ′ (each
contract option’s price is p0 − ). There are two cases. In the first case that δi < 1 at solu-
tion Φ′, we first prove E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  = 0) > mip0. To do this, there are two subcases
depending on whether mi ∈ [mi′(1 − δi′),mi′(1 + δi′)] or not. In the first subcase that mi /∈
[mi′(1 − δi′),mi′(1 + δi′)], we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  = 0) > mip0 by Claim 8.3. In the
second subcase that mi ∈ [mi′(1 − δi′),mi′(1 + δi′)], we have ∆i,i′ < δi by Claim 8.7. We can
prove E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  = 0) > mip0 as illustrated in Figure 11. We have E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ =
∆i,i′ ,  = 0) = mip0. Thus, since ∆i,i′ < δi by Claim 8.7 and E[Ci′(mi,∆)] is strictly increas-
ing in ∆ ∈ [∆i,i′ , δi] by Claim 8.3, we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  = 0) > mip0. Thus, since
E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  ≥ 0) is continuous as a function of , there exists a range [0, th,i,i′ ], th,i,i′ > 0
of  such that E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  ∈ [0, th,i,i′ ]) > mip0 as illustrated in Figure 11. Under such
a  ∈ [0, th,i,i′ ], we will show that E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤ E[Ci′(mi,∆)] for any ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i] as illustrated
in Figure 11. Since at the solution near Φ′, ∆th,i = min(1,
kδi+2(p0−p)+
√
(kδi+2(p0−p))2−k2δ2i
k ) and
p = p0 − , we have ∆th,i ≥ δi. For ∆ ∈ [0, δi], we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] ≥ mip by Claim 8.3 and
E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mip, and therefore E[Ci′(mi,∆)] ≥ E[Ci(mi,∆)]. If ∆th,i > δi, for ∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i],
since ∆i,i′ < δi by Claim 8.7, E[Ci′(mi,∆)] is strictly increasing in ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] by Claim 8.3
and  ∈ [0, th,i,i′ ], we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > E[Ci′(mi,∆)](∆ = δi,  ∈ [0, th,i,i′ ]) ≥ mip0. Thus, since
E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤ mip0 for ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] by the definition of ∆th,i, we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > E[Ci(mi,∆)]
for ∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i]. In the second case that δi = 1 at solution Φ′, we have ∆th,i = δi = 1. For any
solution near Φ′, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mip for ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i]. Thus, since E[Ci′(mi,∆)] ≥ mip for
∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i] at the solution by Claim 8.3, we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] ≥ E[Ci(mi,∆)].
For each pair of i, i′ ∈ [1, n], i′ 6= i, there exists a range [0, th,i,i′ ] of  such that E[Ci(mi,∆)] ≤
E[Ci′(mi,∆)] under the solutions Φ′′ (around Φ′). Let ˆ = min
i,i′∈[1,n]
th,i,i′ . ∀ ∈ [0, ˆ], we have
E[Ci′(mi,∆)] ≥ E[Ci(mi,∆)] for any ∆ ∈ [0,∆th,i]. Thus, the lemma holds.
Next, we will prove Lemma 5.4.
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E[Ci’(mi,∆)](𝜖 = 0)
δi
△th,i
mip0
mip
Type-mi customer’s cost
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△i,i’
E[Ci(mi,∆)](𝜖 ∈ [0, 𝜖𝑡ℎ,𝑖,𝑖′])
E[Ci’(mi,∆)](𝜖 ∈ [0, 𝜖𝑡ℎ,𝑖,𝑖′])
Figure 11: Illustration of the intuition of proof in Lemma 8.8
Proof. As shown in Lemma 8.8, there exists an ˆ > 0 such that for all 0 <  < ˆ, the solutions Φ′′
(around Φ′) are feasible. Under these feasible solutions, we have
∆th,i = min(1,
kδi + 2(p0 − p) +
√
(kδi + 2(p0 − p))2 − k2δ2i
k
)
= min(1, δi +
2
k
+
2
√
2 + kδi
k
) (42)
where δi = min(1,
mn
mi
− 12 ). If δi = 1, we have ∆th,i = 1. Otherwise if 0 ≤ δi < 1, we have
∆th,i =

δi +
2
k +
2
√
2+kδi
k , 0 ≤  ≤ k(1−δi)
2
4
1,  > k(1−δi)
2
4
(43)
For any 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1, we have ∆th,i as a function of  is continuous at  = 0.
To compute the supplier’s profit at solution (each option’s price is p0 − ,  ∈ [0, th]) near Φ′, we
need to compute the supplier’s revenue, and energy generation cost, capacity cost, respectively. To
to do this, we first analyze the option choice of each type-mi customer with ∆. For each type-mi
customer with ∆ ≤ δi, it may choose option i or other option i′. If it chooses other option i′, it must
have mi ∈ [mi′(1−δi′),mi′(1+δi′)] and ∆ ≤ ∆i,i′ . To show this, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mip. If mi /∈
[mi′(1−δi′),mi′(1+δi′)], we have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > mip by Claim 8.3 and E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > E[Ci(mi,∆)],
and thus the customer will not choose option i′. If mi ∈ [mi′(1 − δi′),mi′(1 + δi′)],∆ > ∆i,i′ , we
have E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > mip by Claim 8.3, and E[Ci′(mi,∆)] > E[Ci(mi,∆)], and thus it will not choose
option i′. Thus, we have if type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ [0, δi] chooses other option i′, it must have mi ∈
[mi′(1−δi′),mi′(1+δi′)] and ∆ ≤ ∆i,i′ . If ∆th,i > δi, for each type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i], it
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chooses option i. This is because by Lemma 8.8, we have E[Ci′(mi,∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i],  ∈ [0, th])] > mip0
and E[Ci(mi,∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i],  ∈ [0, th])] ≤ mip0, and thus E[Ci′(mi,∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i],  ∈ [0, th])] >
E[Ci(mi,∆ ∈ (δi,∆th,i],  ∈ [0, th])]. Thus, it must choose option i. For each type-mi customer with
∆ > ∆th,i, it chooses baseline pricing scheme.
We now compute the supplier’s revenue. For type-mi of customer with ∆ ∈ [0, δi], it may choose
option i and other options. If it choose other option i′, its whole demand range must be within
option i′ contract range, and thus it contributes mipi amount of payment to the supplier. Thus,
the supplier’s total revenue from type-mi of customers is
∫∆th,i
0
f(∆)mipid∆ +
∫ 1
∆th,i
f(∆)mip0d∆ =
mipi∆th,i +mip0(1−∆th,i). Next, we compute the supplier’s energy generation cost. For type-mi of
customer with ∆ ∈ [0, δi], its mean demand is mi and thus the supplier’s total energy generation cost
from type-mi of customers is c0mi.
We now analyze the estimated capacity of a type-mi customer considering it may choose other types
of options. At the solution Φ′′ (around Φ′), let C¯i be the expected estimated capacity of type-mi of
customers. Similarly with the analysis of the estimated capacity of m1 type customers by the supplier,
we can derive each Ci. Note that at the solution near Φ
′, we can derive m1(1 + δ1) < m2(1 + δ2) <
. . . < mn(1 + δn) and thus type-mi customers does not choose option i
′, (i′ < i), since we assume the
customer chooses the contract option that results in the lowest profit to the supplier in the worst case
as mentioned in Section 5. We also have m1(1 − δ1) ≤ m2(1 − δ2) ≤ . . . ≤ mn(1 − δn). To compute
C¯i, there are three cases.
In the first case, consider mnm1 ≤ 32 . We have ∆i,i′ = 1 −
mi′ (1−δi′ )
mi
, i′ = i, . . . , n. Thus, since
δi′ =
mn
mi′
− 12 , i′ = i, . . . , n, we have δi = ∆i,i > ∆i,i+1 > . . . > ∆i,n > 0. For a type-mi of
customer with ∆ ∈ [∆i,i′+1,∆i,i′ ], i′ = i, . . . , n − 1, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . =
E[Ci′(mi,∆)] = mip < E[Ci′′(mi,∆)], i′′ > i′. The supplier can choose any option among options
i, . . . , i′. Since mi(1 + δi) < mi+1(1 + δi+1) < . . . < mi′(1 + δi′), we assume type-mi of customer
chooses contract option i′ since the estimated capacity of the customer is mi′(1 + δi′) which is the
worst for the supplier, the revenue it contributes to the supplier is mip whatever option it chooses,
the mean energy consumption it results in is mi whatever option it chooses, and therefore the profit it
chooses option i′ is the worst. For a type-mi of customer with ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,n], we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] =
E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . = E[Cn(mi,∆)] = mip and we assume it chooses option n for the worst-case
profit of the supplier. Besides, type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ [δi,∆th,i] subscribes to option i. Moreover,
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type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ [∆th,i, 1] subscribes to the baseline pricing scheme. Thus, we have
C¯i = 2mn(1−∆th,i) +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i − δi) +
n−1∑
i′=i
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n
= 2mn(1−∆th,i) +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i −∆i,i+1) +
n−1∑
i′=i+1
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n
The last equality follows since ∆i,i = δi.
In the second case, consider mnmi ≥ 2. Assume mnmj > 32 and mnmj+1 ≤ 32 , j = i, . . . , n − 1. We have
δi′ = 1, i
′ = i, . . . , j, δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 , i
′ = j + 1, . . . , n by Proposition 4.1. We also have mi(1 − δi) ≤
mi+1(1 − δi+1) ≤ . . . ≤ mn(1 − δn). Assume mi ≥ mj′(1 − δj′) and mi < mj′+1(1 − δj′+1), j′ =
j+ 1, . . . , n− 1. We have δi = ∆i,i = ∆i,i+1 = . . . = ∆i,j = 1 > . . . > ∆i,j′ ≥ 0. Since E[Ci′(mi,∆)] >
mip, i
′ = j′+1, . . . , n by Claim 8.3 and E[Ci(mi,∆)] = mip for ∆ ∈ [0, 1], type-mi of customer will not
choose options j′+1, . . . , n−1. For a type-mi of customer with ∆ ∈ [∆i,i′+1,∆i,i′ ], i′ = j+1, . . . , j′−1,
we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . = E[Ci′(mi,∆)] < E[Ci′′(mi,∆)], i′′ > i′ and the
customer may choose any contract option among options i, . . . , i′. Since mi(1+δi) < mi+1(1+δi+1) <
. . . < mi′(1+δi′), we assume type-mi of customer choose contract option i
′ since the estimated capacity
of the customer is mi′(1 + δi′) which causes the worst-case profit for the supplier. For a type-mi of
customer with ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,j′ ], we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . = E[Cj′(mi,∆)] = mip
and we assume it chooses option j′ for the worst-case profit of the supplier. Besides, type-mi customer
with ∆ ∈ [∆i,j+1, 1] subscribes to option j for the worst case-profit of the supplier.
C¯i = mj(1 + δj)(1−∆i,j+1) +
j′−1∑
i′=j+1
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mj′(1 + δj′)∆i,j′
= 2mn(1−∆th,i) +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i − 1) +mj(1 + δj)(1−∆i,j+1)
+
j′−1∑
i′=j+1
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mj′(1 + δj′)∆i,j′
The second equality follows since ∆th,i = δi = 1.
In the third case, consider 32 <
mn
mi
≤ 2. Assume mnmj > 32 and mnmj+1 ≤ 32 , j = i, . . . , n − 1.
We have δi′ = 1, i
′ = i, . . . , j, δi′ = mnmi′ −
1
2 , i
′ = j + 1, . . . , n by Proposition 4.1. We also have
δi = ∆i,i = ∆i,i+1 = . . . = ∆i,j = 1 > . . . > ∆i,n > 0. For a type-mi of customer with ∆ ∈
[∆i,i′+1,∆i,i′ ], i
′ = j + 1, . . . , n − 1, we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] = E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . = E[Ci′(mi,∆)] <
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E[Ci′′(mi,∆)], i′′ > i′ and the customer may choose any contract option among options j + 1, . . . , i′.
Since mi(1 + δi) < mi+1(1 + δi+1) < . . . < mi′(1 + δi′), we assume type-mi of customer choose
contract option i′ since the estimated capacity of the customer is mi′(1 + δi′) which causes the worst-
case profit for the supplier. For a type-mi of customer with ∆ ∈ [0,∆i,n], we have E[Ci(mi,∆)] =
E[Ci+1(mi,∆)] = . . . = E[Cn(mi,∆)] = mip and we assume it chooses option n for the worst-case
profit of the supplier. Besides, type-mi customer with ∆ ∈ [∆i,j+1, 1] subscribes to option j for the
worst-case profit of the supplier. Thus, we have
C¯i = mj(1 + δj)(1−∆1,j+1) +
n−1∑
i′=j+1
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n
= 2mn(1−∆th,i) +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i − 1) +mj(1 + δj)(1−∆1,j+1)
+
n−1∑
i′=j+1
mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n
The second equality follows since ∆th,i = δi = 1. Overall, we can write
C¯i = 2mn(1−∆th,i) +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i − ∆ˆth,i) + C ′i (44)
where
C ′i =

∑n−1
i′=i+1mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n, mnmi ≤ 32
mj(1 + δj)(1−∆i,j+1) +
∑j′−1
i′=j+1mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mj′(1 + δj′)∆i,j′ , mnmi ≥ 2
mj(1 + δj)(1−∆i,j+1) +
∑n−1
i′=j+1mi′(1 + δi′)(∆i,i′ −∆i,i′+1) +mn(1 + δn)∆i,n, mnmi ∈ [ 32 , 2]
(45)
and
∆ˆth,i =

∆i,i+1,
mn
mi
≤ 32
1, mnmi >
3
2
(46)
Note that C ′i, ∆ˆth,i are independent of  since ∆i,i′ is independent of . C
′
i can be regarded as the
supplier’s estimated capacity of type-mi customers choosing other options, and ∆ˆth,i can be regarded
as the threshold of type-mi of customers which choose option i or other options. In particular, if
∆ ≤ ∆ˆth,i, the customer chooses other options, and if ∆ˆth,i ≤ ∆ ≤ ∆th,i, the customer chooses option
i.
Thus, the supplier’s worst-case profit under the solution (each contract option’s price is pi = p =
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p0 − ) is
P (Φ) = N(h(m1)(m1(p1∆th,1 + p0(1−∆th,1))− cˆ(C ′1 +m1(1 + δ1)(∆th,1 − ∆ˆth,1) + 2mn(1−∆th,1))− c0m1)
. . .
+Nh(mn)(mn(pn∆th,n + p0(1−∆th,n))− cˆ(C ′n +mn(1 + δn)(∆th,n − ∆ˆth,n) + 2mn(1−∆th,n))− c0mn)
=
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)
(
mi
(
(p0 − )∆th,i + p0(1−∆th,i)
)− cˆ(C ′i +mi(1 + δi)(∆th,i − ∆ˆth,i) + 2mn(1−∆th,i))− c0mi)
=
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)
(
∆th,i
(−mi− cˆmi(1 + δi) + 2mncˆ)+mip0 − cˆ(C ′i −mi(1 + δi)∆ˆth,i + 2mn)− c0mi)
We have
∂P (Φ)
∂
=
n∑
i=1
Nh(mi)
(
(−mi− cˆmi(1 + δi) + 2mncˆ)∂∆th,i
∂
−mi∆th,i
)
(47)
We will prove ∂P (Φ)∂ > 0 at  = 0. Note that ∆th,i is continuous at  = 0 for i ∈ [1, n] and P (Φ) is
continuous at  = 0. For each i ∈ [1, n − 1], we have either δi = 1 or δi < 1. In the former case, we
have
∂∆th,i
∂ = 0 at  = 0 and in the latter case we have
∂∆th,i
∂ =
2
k +
2+kδi
k
√
2+kδi
= +∞ at  = 0 since
δi = min(
mn
mi
− 12 , 1) ≥ 12 > 0 by Proposition 4.1. Thus, we have ∂∆th,i∂ ≥ 0 for i ∈ [1, n−1]. For i = n,
we have δi =
1
2 . Thus, by Equation 43, we have
∂∆th,i
∂ =
2
k +
2+ 12k
k
√
2+ 12k
= +∞ at  = 0. Thus, since
−mi− cˆmi(1+δi)+2mncˆ = −cˆmi(1+δi)+2mncˆ > 0 at  = 0, and mi∆th,i = miδi is a finite number,
we have ∂P (Φ)∂ = +∞ > 0 at  = 0 for each i ∈ [1, n]. Thus, since P (Φ) is a continuous function as
 ≥ 0, there must exist a range [0, 0], 0 ≤ ˆ of  such that the solution Φ′′ (around Φ′) is both feasible
and produces at least the amount of profit Φ′ results in under the “pessimistic” assumption. In other
words, the lemma holds.
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